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Abstract
We consider the role of the nonrecourse financing of securitization by a financial institution
(FI). Our model suggests that even though the FI has the opportunity to provide liquidity
support afterward, it is optimal for the FI to use the nonrecourse financing of securitization
initially, because the nonrecourse security makes liquidation of the original asset more at-
tractive for an FI that knows that the original asset is bad. However, our model also predicts
that the nonrecourse financing of securitization, together with short-term maturity financ-
ing, forces the financial system to perform inefficiently in handling troubled loans and causes
problems with inefficient liquidity support and overinvestment under certain conditions, de-
spite the nonrecourse property of securitization. The theoretical results provide empirical
implications for recent problems with securitized and structured finance in the United States
and Europe.
JEL Classification Code: D82, D86, G21, G23, G24, G33.




Many commercial and investment banks have recently issued structured finance products
such as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) into
which mortgages and other loans are pooled. These banks have also made extensive use
of off-balance-sheet financing in originating these products. For example, the portfolios of
structured finance products are transferred to off-balance-sheet vehicles. To raise funds for
originating the products, banks act as sponsors for asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)
programs. In these programs, off-balance-sheet vehicles–ABCP conduits and structured
investment vehicles (SIVs)–issue ABCP to third-party investors, and pay their sponsoring
banks for transferred assets with the proceeds of the ABCP. The principal and interest
payments of ABCP to third-party investors are made by the cash flows that are generated
from the assets transferred to the off-balance-sheet vehicles. As a result, the off-balance-
sheet vehicles invest in illiquid long-maturity assets and issue short-maturity paper. Because
the debt obligations of off-balance-sheet vehicles are usually contractually remote from the
sponsoring banks, these banks are not required to treat the assets and debt obligations of
such vehicles as their own. In this sense, such financing has the nonrecourse property for
sponsoring banks. However, to ensure funding liquidity, sponsoring banks typically provide
their conduits and vehicles with credit enhancement, liquidity support, or both, despite
the nonrecourse property. For this reason, if an ABCP conduit or SIV cannot roll over its
maturing paper, and thus liquidity drawdowns are made to the full extent of the outstanding
commercial paper (CP), the sponsoring bank is forced to provide funding support to the
ABCP conduit or SIV and thus becomes the sole funding provider. Note that renegotiation
is practically impossible in securitization. The sponsoring bank can then direct the ABCP
conduit or the SIV either to maintain its assets or to sell them in the market.1
The federal mortgage agencies (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) also issue MBSs and struc-
tured mortgage products. As they guarantee each MBS they issue, securitization involves a
liquidity support problem whose effect is similar to that of the securitization of mortgages
from commercial and investment banks.2
The goal of this paper is to explore the role of nonrecourse financing of securitization.
The main question in this paper is whether it is optimal for a financial institution (FI) to
1For institutional details, see Gorton (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), and Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2009).
2For these issues, see the website of Freddie Mac (http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs).
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offer a security that is backed by an investment asset with a nonrecourse property. In the
context of structured finance products, this question is equivalent to discussing why the FI
invests in illiquid long-term assets, borrows using nonrecourse short-term securities financed
by off-balance-sheet vehicles, and accepts the possibility of providing liquidity support for
these vehicles afterward, despite the nonrecourse property. Indeed, if the FI provides liq-
uidity support to off-balance-sheet vehicles, why would the FI use nonrecourse financing
of securitization in the first place? Many reasons come to mind, including regulatory and
ratings arbitrage, where the FI takes most of the risky loans off its balance sheet to avoid
holding costly capital against them, and a low and predictable short-term interest rate envi-
ronment, where many profitable managers are ‘searching for yield’. However, it is interesting
to investigate whether the FI should exploit the nonrecourse financing of securitization, even
though these institutional features disappear.
To attain this goal, we construct a model in which an FI has investment opportunities but
does not have sufficient funds because it must meet other ‘liquidity needs’ or constraints.
Even in this situation, the FI may still invest its own funds and finance the outstanding
required funds from external initial uninformed investors (denoted by UIs). To do so, the FI
may offer a security that is backed by only the underlying investment asset. For practical
or theoretical reasons, we assume that the FI finances the outstanding required funds with
short-term securities, thereby allowing the withdrawal of UIs before the cash flows of the
asset are realized (in other words, a maturity mismatch exists between the underlying asset
and its funding source).3 The FI is then exposed to the risk of early withdrawal by the
UIs even though the security has the nonrecourse property. However, the FI may have an
advantage if the FI acquires information as a delegated monitor on behalf of the UIs when
new information is realized after the investment.
The FI then faces two problems. The first is that despite the FI’s willingness to continue
with the investment, the UIs may withdraw their funds upon the arrival of bad news because
they do not have access to the private information held by the FI. If the FI wishes to continue,
it must then finance the withdrawn funds from the ex post capital market by issuing claims
3For simplicity, as in the recent financial crisis literature (see Diamond and Rajan (2009), He and
Xiong (2009), Shleifer and Vishny (2010), Uhlig (2010), Huang and Ratnovski (2011), and Acharya and
Viswanathan (2011)), we have not modeled the choice of maturity structure specifically until Section 6.1.
In Section 6.1, we relax this assumption and show that all of our results still hold. For theoretical studies
exploring the reasons different maturities are used, see Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Flannery (1994), Berglof
and von Thadden (1994), Diamond and Rajan (2001), Stein (2005), Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2010), and
Segura and Suarez (2011).
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backed by its own assets and providing liquidity support even though the initial security
has the nonrecourse property.4 Thus, UIs may create and amplify risk for the FI in the
event of their withdrawal, precipitated by adverse perceptions of the investment asset. The
second problem is that the private information held by the FI also causes an adverse selection
problem in the ex post capital market. This forces the FI to issue an underpriced security.
Faced with this combination of problems, the FI must decide whether to issue an initial
security with a nonrecourse property in the first place. The FI may also decide whether to
undertake information acquisition. In turn, the FI’s decisions may cause a problem with
overinvestment.
Let us suppose that the FI, the UIs, and the investment assets are identified as the spon-
soring bank, ABCP investors, and MBSs and CDOs or their original assets, and that the
initial nonrecourse security that allows the early withdrawal of the UIs is interpreted as the
ABCP issued by the ABCP conduit or SIV. This model serves to clarify why the FI employs
nonrecourse securitized bank loans even though these loans result in losses from suboptimal
risk sharing and the FI takes the opportunity to provide liquidity support afterward. The
model also sheds light on the question of whether the nonrecourse financing of securitization
forces the financial system to perform less efficiently in handling troubled loans, thereby
causing an overinvestment problem.
If the FI can choose whether to undertake information acquisition, the main theoretical
results of the paper are as follows.
(i) A security with a nonrecourse property backed by a particular asset held by the FI is ex
ante preferred to any security backed by its total assets, such as deposit claims.
(ii) Under the optimal nonrecourse security, the UI always withdraws early when future
economic conditions are expected to be bad.
(iii) Uninformed finance, inefficient liquidity support, and overinvestment are more likely to
arise, despite the nonrecourse property of the security, as the profitability of the asset at
the high revenue state is larger or the liquidation value of the asset relative to the amount
funded by the UI is smaller or the likelihood of success for the asset investment is expected
to be higher.
4Many recent papers (for example, see Diamond and Rajan (2009), Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman
(2011), and Acharya and Viswanathan (2011)) have tried to explain the fire sale or market freeze phenom-
ena. These models all rely on an implicit assumption that financial intermediaries are constrained from
raising outside funds during financial distress. Our paper complements these studies because many financial
intermediaries were able to raise outside funds during the recent credit crises.
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Our model suggests that it is optimal for the FI to use the nonrecourse financing of
securitization initially even though the FI takes the opportunity to provide liquidity support
afterward. However, our model also predicts that the nonrecourse financing of securitization,
together with short-term maturity financing, is more likely to force the financial system to
perform inefficiently in handling troubled loans, thereby causing problems with inefficient
liquidity support and overinvestment, if the profitability of the asset at the high revenue
state increases or if the liquidation value of the asset relative to the amount funded by the
UI decreases or if the likelihood of success with the asset investment increases.
Intuitively, the reason a security with a nonrecourse property backed by a particular asset
held by the FI is ex ante preferred to any security backed by its total assets is because the
former mitigates the unfavorable effect of the adverse selection problem of the FI raising
additional funds to avoid the liquidation of the remaining assets of the FI when the UI
withdraws early at the rollover date. More specifically, the nonrecourse security makes its
original asset remote from the remaining assets of the FI, thereby enabling the FI to do
without the liquidation of the remaining assets of the FI when liquidating the original asset.
This makes liquidation of the original asset of the nonrecourse security more attractive for an
FI that knows that the original asset is bad. Thus, by establishing bankruptcy remoteness,
the nonrecourse security can reduce any additional adverse selection cost in the ex post
capital market even though the FI may raise additional funds to provide liquidity support.
Such optimality of the nonrecourse security depends on the short-term maturity structure
of the security, under which the UI can withdraw early upon the arrival of bad news. Short-
term financing then makes the recourse financing disadvantageous by creating an unfavorable
effect of the additional adverse selection problem caused by the early withdrawal of the UI,
while making nonrecourse financing advantageous by ruling out the unfavorable effect of
raising the FI’s borrowing cost in response to the rise in bankruptcy possibility at time 2.
On the other hand, the early withdrawal of the UI when future economic conditions are
expected to be bad stems from the following. If the UI withdraws early, the FI incurs the
adverse selection cost of raising additional funds when continuing to invest. By contrast, if
the UI continues with the investment, the FI incurs an opportunistic strategy cost because
the FI cannot be committed to liquidating a devalued asset. Indeed, the FI prefers to issue
a security that induces the early withdrawal of the UI because the adverse selection cost
is smaller than the opportunistic strategy cost if the FI can choose whether to undertake
information acquisition.
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Given the early withdrawal of the UI when future economic conditions are expected to be
bad, the third main result is obtained because, under the conditions stated in this result,
an FI with a high-quality asset is less likely to be distinguished from an FI with a devalued
asset, even by adjusting the repayments to outside investors in the ex post capital market.
A pooling strategy with overinvestment then prevails, because an FI with a devalued asset
incurs no additional costs other than repayment when imitating an FI with a high-quality
asset. It is not surprising that uninformed finance is more likely to prevail under the condi-
tions stated in the third main result, because information acquired by the FI is less likely to
be used.
The logic of this paper, that the nonrecourse financing of securitization is optimal, is closely
related to that of Inderst and Mueller (2010), who examine optimal CEO compensation
and retirement policy when the CEO is informed privately about the firm’s continuation
value under his leadership. Inderst and Mueller show that under certain circumstances,
steep incentive and severance pay makes quitting attractive for “bad” CEOs who know that
they do not have the necessary ability to manage the firm. On the other hand, because
the nonrecourse security in our model makes the original asset remote from the remaining
assets of the FI, it enables the FI to avoid the liquidation of the remaining assets of the
FI when liquidating the original asset. This makes liquidation of the original asset more
attractive for an FI that knows that the original asset is bad. If abandoning the investment
is viewed as abandoning the firm’s management position, the role of nonrecourse financing of
securitization in our model seems to correspond well to that of steep incentive and severance
pay in Inderst and Mueller.
Holmström and Tirole (1998) investigate a model where firms can meet their future liq-
uidity needs by obtaining an irrevocable line of credit from a financial institution that issues
shares backed by claims on its financial position. Winton (2003) considers how the firm’s
initial choice between debt and equity finance is determined when the financial institution
must always meet its interim liquidity needs by issuing securities backed only by its claims
on the firm. However, neither of these studies deals with the optimality of the nonrecourse
financing of securitization in the ex ante stage, when the FI may provide liquidity support
in the ex post stage, despite the nonrecourse property.
This paper relates to the literature on security design and securitization. DeMarzo and
Duffie (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) suggest that the process of pooling and tranching in se-
curitization alleviates the underpricing involved in the asset sale because it enhances risk
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diversification and prevents informed intermediates from exploiting uninformed investors
under an ex post signaling model. Conversely, by endogenizing both the withdrawal and liq-
uidity support decisions, our model suggests that the nonrecourse property of securitization
mitigates the underpricing involved in the additional financing required by the FI when UIs
withdraw. Taking the short-term maturity structure as given, Shleifer and Vishny (2010),
Uhlig (2010), and Huang and Ratnovski (2011) provide an interesting model of financial
intermediaries that securitize, distribute, and trade loans. On the other hand, Brunnermeier
and Oehmke (2010) and Segura and Suarez (2011) develop a model of endogenous maturity
structure for financial institutions. However, these studies do not explore the optimality
of nonrecourse financing with credit enhancement policy in securitization. The difference
between our work and the above-mentioned papers is that we derive the interrelated role of
the nonrecourse and short-term maturity financing of securitization endogenously.5
Indeed, this is the first paper to explore the optimality of nonrecourse financing of secu-
ritization when creditors refuse to rollover their lending and withdraw early at the rollover
date. Previous papers, such as Benveniste and Berger (1987) and Carlstrom and Samolyk
(1995), claim that either exogenous recourse or capital constraints on the sponsoring bank
is a key factor that creates the need for securitized bank loans. By contrast, our model at-
tempts to explain endogenously why the nonrecourse financing of securitization occurs even
though the FI may provide liquidity support afterward. Ayotte and Gaon (2011) investigate
securitization by focusing on the special protection provided by “bankruptcy remoteness”
and suggest that the nonrecourse security protects the security holders from dilution of their
claims when the debtor-in-possession (DIP) lenders can issue additional senior claims in
bankruptcy. However, Ayotte and Gaon do not allow the security holders to withdraw early,
nor do they discuss the adverse selection issues. Our paper highlights the role of the nonre-
course security that alleviates the adverse selection incentive in the additional financing of
the FI when the security holders withdraw early.6
5Gorton and Souleles (2006) also provide a model for securitization and special-purpose vehicles (SPVs)
and show that the repeated relational contract relation explains sponsoring banks’ liquidity support of
their SPVs in certain states of the world. The relational contract relation has also been explained by
Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993). In our paper, the liquidity support by sponsoring banks can be
derived without any reputational considerations. Campello and de Matta (2011) discuss the “empty creditor”
problem in credit default swaps (CDSs). Although CDS contracts affect lenders’ preference between out-
of-court restructuring and bankruptcy, Campello and de Matta do not consider the additional financing
required by the borrower when the borrower’s revenue is short, nor do they discuss the adverse selection
issues.
6For the literature of nonrecourse financing other than securitization, John (1993) develops an analysis
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 examines
equilibrium under informed finance. Section 4 specifies the uninformed finance equilibrium
and discusses the equilibrium configuration of informed and uninformed finance. Further,
this section makes it clear that nonrecourse financing of securitization is optimal. Section
5 explores the empirical implications. Section 6 assesses the robustness of the main results.
Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The Model
The model has three periods (t = 0, 1, 2). All agents are risk neutral and the risk-free
discount rate of interest is zero.
At the beginning of time 0, a financial institution (denoted by FI) holds cash I − I (> 0)
and an asset AO that yields a cash flow at time 2.7 In addition, the FI has a new investment
AI that yields a cash flow at time 2 but requires a fixed investment outlay of I at the
beginning of time 0. Thus, the FI must raise the shortfall of I. To finance the amount I, the
FI issues asset-backed securities that are sold to outside initial investors at the beginning of
time 0. However, the outside initial investors can demand the redemption of these securities
at time 1 (for the relaxation of this assumption, see Section 6.1). For brevity, we refer to
these outside initial investors as UIs. Further, there are many other outside investors in the
ex post capital market. We provide additional details about the financing problem later in
this section.
The cash flows of AI and AO for each contingency and their conditional probabilities are
given in Table 1. More specifically, at the end of time 0, we allow for two states of nature,
s ∈ {g, b}. The good state of nature, g, occurs with probability p (∈ (0, 1)), and the bad
state, b, occurs with probability 1− p. There are three qualities of AI , q ∈ {h,m, `}, which
of spin-offs that enjoy the benefit of debt-related tax shields. She indicates that the investment disincen-
tives caused by the introduction of risky debt may be reduced by spin-offs. Chemmanur and John (1996)
analyze limited-recourse project financing and spin-offs under a symmetric information model driven by
considerations of corporate control. Kahn and Winton (2004) suggest that “bipartite” structures–two sep-
arate subsidiaries that make loans of similar type but differing risk; for example, a “good bank/bad bank”
structure–reduce risk-shifting incentives in the safer subsidiary by insulating safer loans from riskier loans.
However, none of these papers discusses the continuation/liquidation decision of the financial intermediary
after the withdrawal of uninformed investors under the adverse selection environment. Thus, these papers
cannot show clearly that the nonrecourse property of securitization mitigates the underpricing involved in
the additional financing of financial intermediation after the uninformed investors withdraw.
7Although we may interpret the FI as a nonfinancial firm, our model is particularly appropriate to financial
firms because they tend to use higher leverage and more short-term debt.
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differ in their earnings ability. If s = g, then q = h occurs with certainty. Alternatively, if s
= b, then q = m occurs with probability δ (∈ (0, 1)) and q = ` occurs with probability 1 −
δ. This framework can capture the situation where the quality of AI deteriorates during the
lending period, even though it appears to be good at the time of the initial investment.
If investment in AI is continued at time 2, AI generates a cash flow that depends on q. If
q = h, then AI yields a cash flow R with certainty. Next, if q = m, then AI yields R with
probability σm (∈ (0, 1)) and yields no cash flow with probability 1 − σm. If q = `, then AI
yields R with probability σ` (∈ (0, 1)) and yields no cash flow with probability 1− σ`. As q
= m is a higher-quality type than q = `, we assume that σm > σ`.
For asset AO, we assume that because of market- or industry-level fluctuations, the cash
flow distributions of AI and AO are correlated: AO yields a cash flow Z with certainty if
AI yields R, whereas AO yields Z with probability σZ (∈ (0, 1)) and no cash flow with
probability 1 − σZ if AI yields no cash flow. Hence, σZ is interpreted as the probability of
success in AO when AI yields no cash flow.
If AI is liquidated at time 1, it can be redeployed for the value L. However, if investment
in AI is continued through time 2, the liquidation value is zero. Conversely, we assume that
AO generates no liquidation value at times 1 and 2. No liquidation value of AO at time 1 is
assumed because we focus on the case where the liquidity provision for the FI is limited at
time 1 when s = b. In fact, our main results hold if the expected cash flow of AO at s = b
is sufficiently larger than its liquidation value.
For the information structure, at the end of time 0, each agent can observe the state of
nature, s, that captures the future economic environment that affects the quality of AI .
However, as the state of nature reflects immeasurable perceptions in the marketplace about
the future economic environment, we assume that it is observable but not verifiable. In
addition, at the end of time 0, the FI can privately observe the quality of AI .8 These
assumptions imply that only the FI can distinguish between q = m and q = `, although
q = h is observable (but not verifiable). We also assume that both the cash flow and the
liquidation value outcomes of AI and AO are observable and verifiable. Finally, we assume
that all of the probabilities are common knowledge.
Note that the likelihood of AI or AO generating a positive cash flow is larger for q = m
than for q = ` as long as σm > σ`. Hence, the UI and outside investors in the ex post capital
market face adverse selection problems at s = b regardless of whether the FI issues a security
8The case of an uninformed FI is discussed in Section 4.1.
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backed by the cash flows of AI , or AO, or both.
The structure of the game is illustrated in Figure 1, and is described as follows.
(1) At the beginning of time 0, the FI places its funds I − I in AI and offers the UI an
initial security to seek I. The UI then decides whether to place funds I in the security.
(2) At the end of time 0, the state s and the quality q are realized.
(3) The UI decides whether to continue or withdraw at time 1, given its updated beliefs
about q.9
(a) If the UI chooses to continue, the FI decides whether to continue or liquidate AI at time
1, given the realized value q.10
(b) If the UI withdraws at time 1, the FI decides whether to continue or liquidate AI at
time 1, given the realized value q. If the FI chooses to continue, it issues a new security to
outside investors in the capital market at time 1. The outside investors then decide whether
to place their funds in the security, given their updated beliefs.
(4) Whenever possible, the beliefs of each agent must satisfy Bayes’ rule.
To solve the model, we use the concept of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We are now in a position to consider how the FI finances the amount I. In the subsequent
analysis, we focus on the effect of the securitization of the cash flow of AI or the cash flows
of AI and AO. To this end, we formalize the following arrangement. First, we assume
that the FI has a superior understanding of the quality of the assets and their likelihood of
earning returns, whereas other investors do not.11 Hence, if the FI directly sells AI and AO,
their values are substantially discounted. Second, we assume that the FI cannot raise I by
securitizing the cash flow of AO alone until time 1, because these proceeds have been used
for other urgent or opaque liquidity needs of the FI until time 1, when these liquidity needs
disappear. Other liquidity needs may include limited-time investment opportunities, the
contractual takedown or withdrawal of funds by another customer, or a temporary financial
crisis.12
9Allowing the UI to withdraw some but not all of its investment is not optimal because of the linearity
of the model.
10We assume that the FI retains control over the liquidation decision. This is not restrictive, because the
UI is not informed of q at s = b, so that under Assumption 2, imposed below, it would always be forced to
continue to invest if the UI retained control over the liquidation decision. This assumption is also consistent
with actual practice and is supported theoretically by Riddiough (1997), who shows that the junior security
holder should control the liquidation decision under asset-backed securities.
11This holds not only for many relationship-lending assets but also for MBSs. See Glaeser and Kallal
(1997) and DeMarzo (2005).
12There may be several other reasons the FI is initially willing to invest only a limited amount. For
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Hence, at the beginning of time 0, we focus on the case where the FI issues an initial
security backed by the cash flow of AI to raise I. Later, we consider an initial security
backed by the cash flows of AI and AO to relax the nonrecourse property, and we show that
it is still optimal for the FI to issue an initial security backed by the cash flow of AI alone.
As s is unverifiable and q is privately observed at s = b by the FI, the initial security
backed by the cash flow of AI is of the debt type, so that the UI agrees to lend I at time
0 and requires a repayment X at time 2 if AI yields R, and 0 if AI yields no cash flow.13
Because the claims of the UI are secured solely by the cash flow of AI , the UI cannot receive
anything at time 2 when AI yields no cash flow. If liquidation occurs, the UI secures the
liquidation value of the asset in lieu of security repayment. We assume that the claims of
the UI take priority over those of the FI. Thus, the receipts from AI are used to repay the
UI before any revenues are directed to the FI. The priority structure is justified later.
In fact, the UI keeps the option to withdraw funds at time 1. This is equivalent to assuming
that the FI finances the long-term asset AI by issuing a short-term security at time 0 and
letting the UI roll it over at time 1. This assumption seems to correspond well to the nature
of short-term rollover debt such as commercial paper or margins and collateral requirements
in financial contracts.14 However, in Section 6.1, even though the FI can choose the maturity
structure of debt, we show that our main results are unaffected.
Thus, the UI can choose whether to withdraw its funds at time 1, given its updated beliefs
about q and the security provisions, because the UI observes s at the end of time 0. First,
suppose that the UI does not withdraw. The FI must now decide whether to continue or
liquidate. If the FI chooses to continue, investment in AI is continued through time 2. If the
FI chooses to liquidate, each agent receives its claim according to its priority structure at
time 1. Next, suppose that the UI withdraws. Again, the FI must decide whether to continue
or liquidate. However, if the FI chooses to continue, it must assure the UI of I at time 1.15
instance, the FI may be wealth constrained or may prefer to have only limited exposure to an asset for
reasons of risk shifting or capital constraint (see Jones, 2000).
13It is not useful for the FI to report the realization of q to the UI before the UI makes its withdrawal
decision. This is because the FI always reports q = m because q is private information at s = b and the FI
incurs no cost by reporting q = m.
14Short-term maturity financing is assumed by most recent studies of securitization. See the literature in
footnote 3.
15If the FI can choose a smaller promised payment than I when the UI withdraws, the FI is more likely to
continue to invest in AI . However, this implies that inefficient continuation is more likely to occur, because
inefficiency arises only as inefficient continuation in the present model. By contrast, suppose that the FI can
choose a larger promised payment than I–that is, I 0 > I–when the UI withdraws. Regardless of whether
the equilibrium is located in the separating or the pooling region when the FI’s promised payment is fixed
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Thus, the FI must finance the funds withdrawn by the UI, I, at time 1 by raising new funds
from outside investors in the capital market. This can be viewed as the FI giving liquidity
support to the deteriorated asset, although the FI uses the nonrecourse security. Indeed,
after withdrawal, the UI may be allowed to refinance the new funds for the FI in the capital
market, or it may not do so because of an internal code for risky investment. Throughout
most of this paper, we consider the latter. We discuss the former in the Appendix, and show
that our main results are unaffected qualitatively by the modification. If the FI liquidates,
each agent receives its claim according to its priority structure at time 1.
If the UI withdraws at time 1 but the FI wishes to continue, we assume that the FI must
issue a new security backed by AI and AO in the capital market at time 1. The optimality
of this form of security is proved in Section 6.2. As q is privately observed by the FI at s
= b, and as the liquidation values of both AI and AO are zero at time 2, the new security
depends only on the cash flows generated by AI and AO. This implies that in exchange for
funding I, outside investors require a repayment YR+Z at time 2 if AI and AO yield a cash
flow R+Z, a repayment YZ if AI and AO yield Z, and 0 if AI and AO yield no cash flow. We
also assume the monotonicity condition YR+Z ≥ YZ. This is standard in the security design
literature and can be formally justified on the grounds of moral hazard.16
Several remarks on the initial security issued at time 0 are in order. First, we rule out the
possibility that the FI renegotiates the security provision with the UI after the realization
of s and q but before the continuation/withdrawal decision of the UI. This assumption is
plausible because we interpret our model in the securitization setting, where the UI comprises
numerous unknown security holders.
Second, the priority of the claims of the UI in liquidation can be justified in several ways.
For one thing, Axelson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2009) assume that the initial adverse
selection problem of FIs causes strategic defaults of institutions that are not serious. In
our context, this implies that there are many fly-by-night operators that the UI cannot
at I after the withdrawal of the UI, the FI with q = m has no incentive to pay I 0 after the withdrawal of the
UI. Indeed, in the separating region, the additional amount I 0 − I merely causes the FI with q = m to incur
more costs and cannot serve to mitigate adverse selection incentives. In the pooling region, the repayment
level Y m at time 2 that can deter the FI with q = ` from mimicking the FI with q = m does not depend on
I 0 because the self-selection constraint does not depend on I 0. Only the participation constraint of outside
investors in the capital market at t = 1 is affected by I 0. Hence, again, I 0 − I merely increases the costs
incurred by the FI with q = m.
16For justification, see Innes (1990), Nachman and Noe (1994), Axelson (2007) and Axelson, Stromberg
and Weisbach (2009). Because Winton (2003) assumes that the institution meets any liquidity needs by
issuing equity or debt claims on its position in the firm, his model also assumes monotonicity.
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distinguish from a serious FI. We may assume that if the FI can capture some part of the
liquidation value, there are many fly-by-night operators who can earn positive rents by raising
I, investing I in assets with a maximum payoff less than I (but with a positive liquidation
value) and then liquidating the assets. In this situation, the UI cannot break even. Thus,
any optimal security must require that the claims of the FI are junior to the claims of the UI.
It is also possible to justify the priority rule by the unmodeled moral hazard and information
problems of the FI. Winton (1995) argues that most junior claimants should monitor the
project. If the FI does not monitor the asset AI when it has senior claims, our priority
rule may be justified, because the cash flow revenues drop and the security is substantially
underpriced unless the FI has junior claims.17 This priority structure is commonly observed
in practice, where the FI provides credit enhancement such as senior/subordinate structures,
particularly in asset-backed securitization. Bolton and Freixas (2000) assume the priority
structure observed in practice and show that it is the main source (in their model) behind
the banks’ incentive to securitize; that is, banks can do better by undoing priority ordering
through securitization.
To focus on the issue of withdrawal of the UI and to evaluate economic efficiency, we
impose the following parametric restrictions on AI .
Assumption 1: σ`R < L < I < σmR.
Assumption 2: L < σbR, where σb ≡ δσm + (1 − δ)σ`.
Assumption 3: The FI always has an incentive to invest in AI at time 0 because p is
sufficiently large or I is not sufficiently large.
Assumption 1 implies that it is ex post efficient to continue to invest in AI (liquidate AI)
when q = m (q = `). This is because if the FI continues when q = m (q = `), the expected
cash flow of AI , σmR (σ`R), is larger (smaller) than the liquidation value of AI , L. Given
that σb is the probability of AI yielding R conditional on s = b, Assumption 2 indicates that
it is ex post efficient to continue to invest in AI if the quality of AI is uncertain when s =
17In addition, if AI is liquidated at s = b, the UI may face liquidity needs because of the withdrawal
of other investors from its own funds, unless its claims in liquidation are large. The UI is then forced to
liquidate its own assets if it cannot raise the liquidity needs. This possibility is most likely to occur if the
UI is a money market mutual fund, which can neither expect a new inflow of funds in this situation nor
borrow to continue to invest. Even if the UI can raise the required funds, it may be forced to promise
repayment in excess of the fair risk-adjusted level. This is because the adverse selection or moral hazard
problems not modeled here undermine its credibility. This tendency is aggravated if the situation of distress
causes dislocation in the credit and funding markets that could restrict the overall provision and channeling
of credit, or if it induces rating agencies to subsequently downgrade securities issued by the UI.
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b. In our model, if it is optimal to invest in AI at time 0, social welfare depends only on
the decision of whether to continue to invest in AI or liquidate AI at time 1 when s = b.
Assumptions 1 and 3 thus ensure that continuing to invest in AI (liquidating AI) for q = m
(q = `) is the first-best allocation.
Before proceeding to characterize the equilibrium, we put two additional assumptions.
First, the following assumption serves to simplify the analysis of the ex post capital market.







Assumption 4 implies that if q = `, the expected cash flow of AO, [σ` + (1 − σ`)σZ ]Z, is
larger than or equal to that of AI , σ`R, and is also larger than or equal to the investment
of the UI, I. This ensures, in a simplified way, that the FI has an incentive to raise the
withdrawn funds by securitizing AI and AO (or AO alone) at time 1 when s = b. In the
Appendix, we show that our main results are unaffected qualitatively if this assumption is
relaxed.
Second, we impose the following assumption to simplify the subsequent analysis.
Assumption 5: (i) δ > 1 − σmσm−σ` p(1−σb)p+(1−p)σb , and (ii) δ > (1−σZ)σ`σZ+(1−σZ)σ` .
Assumption 5(i) is rewritten as an assumption with respect to p: (i0) p > (1−δ)(σm−σ`)
1−σb .
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Assumption 5(i) and (ii) mainly serves to simplify the equilibrium configuration. Assumption
5(i) is also used to ensure that the FI’s claim in the optimal initial security is nonnegative.
In the Appendix, we discuss the relaxation of Assumption 5.
Assumptions 1—5 can be satisfied when δ (the probability of q = m conditional on s = b)
is large, when p (the probability of s = g or q = h) is large, when Z (the cash flow of AO) is
large, when σZ (the probability of success in AO if AI generates no cash flow) is large, and
when I (the fixed investment outlay of AI) is small.
3. Equilibrium
The game is solved through backward induction. In Section 3.1, we first examine the con-
tinuation/liquidation decision of the FI at time 1, taking as given the continuation/withdrawal
decision of the UI at time 1. If the FI chooses to continue to invest in AI and raises new funds
after the withdrawal of the UI, we also investigate the new security offer decision of the FI
at time 1 in the ex post capital market. Taking into account the optimal decisions of the FI







at time 1, we next discuss the continuation/withdrawal decision of the UI at time 1. Indeed,
this UI’s decision depends on the initial security offer at time 0. Thus, like a Stackelberg
leader, the FI can affect the continuation/withdrawal decision of the UI by adjusting the
initial security offer. In Section 3.2, taking account of the optimal decisions of the FI and
the UI at time 1, we characterize the optimal initial security offer of the FI at time 0.
3.1. The optimal decisions of the FI and the UI at time 1.–
We must first consider the optimal decisions of the FI and the UI at s = g. Because AI
then yields R with certainty, whereas the junior position of the FI’s claim implies that the
FI receives nothing if it liquidates AI , it is trivial that the FI chooses to continue, regardless
of whether the UI withdraws or continues. Given this, the UI’s ex ante individual rationality
constraint ensures that the UI chooses to continue.
However, if s = b, the cash flow of AI depends on q, and is not necessarily positive. Because
only the FI privately knows q at time 1, the analysis is much more complicated. In the rest
of this subsection, we focus on the case of s = b.
In Section 3.1.1, we examine the continuation/liquidation decision of the FI after the UI
continues at s = b. In Section 3.1.2, we discuss the continuation/liquidation decision of the
FI after the UI withdraws at s = b, and derive the optimal new security offer of the FI
in the ex post capital market when the FI continues to invest in AI and raises new funds
after the withdrawal of the UI. As the FI privately knows q, the equilibrium in the ex post
capital market is a signaling equilibrium, which is featured in Lemma 2. Taking account of
the optimal decisions of the FI at time 1 derived in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, we clarify the
continuation/withdrawal decision of the UI at s = b at time 1 in Section 3.1.3.
3.1.1. The continuation/liquidation decision of the FI after the UI continues If
the UI continues, irrespective of whether the FI has q = m or q = `, the FI also continues
because it receives nothing in liquidation. As a result, we present the following lemma.
Lemma 1: When s = b, the FI always continues to invest in AI after the UI continues to
invest in AI at time 1.
Lemma 1 suggests that if the UI does not withdraw at s = b, the FI with q = ` cannot
commit to liquidating AI ; thus, overinvestment occurs for the bad earning ability of the AI
(q = `).
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3.1.2. The continuation/liquidation decision of the FI after the UI withdraws
In this case, suppose that the FI chooses to liquidate. Then, the junior position of the FI’s
claim forces the FI to receive nothing. On the other hand, suppose that the FI chooses to
continue. Then, the FI must finance I to be repaid to the UI in the capital market. The
problem is that the FI knows q, while outside investors in the capital market do not at s
= b. Outside investors can only rationally revise their beliefs after they observe both the
realization of s = b and the FI’s continuation/liquidation and security design decisions at
time 1. As the FI has private information about q, we need to consider not only the pooling
strategy of the FI that does not depend on q but also the separating strategy of the FI that
does depend on q. To refine the optimal strategy of the FI that chooses to continue, we use
the requirement that the equilibrium satisfies the D1 criterion in Banks and Sobel (1987).19
Under D1, outside investors that observe an out-of-equilibrium strategy focus their beliefs
on the type of FI that would benefit them the most from choosing this strategy.
To characterize the signaling equilibrium in the ex post capital market, let FIm denote the
FI with q =m, and let FI` denote the FI with q = `. Under the pooling strategy, we need not
differentiate between the FIm and the FI`. Under the separating strategy, define (Y mR+Z , Y mZ )
as (YR+Z , YZ) issued by the FIm. Define <1 ≡ σ`+(1−σ`)σZσ`[σb+(1−σb)σZ ] and <2 ≡ σ`+(1−σ`)σZσ`[σm+(1−σm)σZ ] , where
<1 > <2.20 Then, we have:
Lemma 2: Suppose that the UI withdraws when s = b.
(i) If 1σ` >
R
I
≥ <1, the pooling strategy prevails: both the FIm and the FI ` prefer to continue
to invest in AI . The repayment level, Y P , is Y P = Iσb+(1−σb)σZ .
(ii) If <1 > RI ≥ <2, the separating strategy prevails: the FIm continues to invest in AI




Y m = σ`Rσ`+(1−σ`)σZ (>
I




(iii) If <2 > RI > 1σm , the separating strategy prevails: the FIm continues to invest in AI




Y m = Iσm+(1−σm)σZ .
Lemma 2 suggests that despite the nonrecourse financing, the FI raises new funds and
gives inefficient liquidity support in some cases after the withdrawal of the UI. Indeed, if
the profitability of AI at success is sufficiently high ( 1σ` > RI ≥ <1), the pooling strategy
19DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and Winton (2003) also impose the D1 refinement criterion.




σ` ) under Assumption 1. It is immediately apparent fromσm > σb > σ` that 1σm < <2 < <1 < 1σ` .
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dominates the separating strategy and brings about efficient investment for the medium
earning ability of AI (q = m), but causes overinvestment (inefficient continuation) for the
bad earning ability of AI (q = `) after the UI withdraws. Note that <1 is the threshold
of R
I
above which both the FIm and the FI` prefer to continue under the pooling strategy.
By contrast, if the profitability of AI at success is not sufficiently high (<1 > RI > 1σm ),
the FI raises new funds only if q = m. Thus, the separating strategy dominates the pooling
strategy and creates efficient investment both for q =m and for q = ` after the UI withdraws.
However, if the profitability of AI at success is moderate (<1 > RI ≥ <2), the FIm must
repay outside investors’ premiums in excess of the fair risk-adjusted level because σ`Rσ`+(1−σ`)σZ
≥ Iσm+(1−σm)σZ . Note that <2 is the threshold of RI above which the FIm must repay outside
investors in excess of the fair risk-adjusted level under the separating strategy.
The intuition is as follows. Under the pooling strategy, if investment in AI is continued,
the FI with q receives R with probability σq but repays Y P = Iσb+(1−σb)σZ with probability σq
+ (1 − σq)σZ. If AI is liquidated, it follows from L < I that the FI cannot receive anything
regardless of its q. Hence, given the definition of <1, both the FIm and the FI` prefer to
continue, raise new funds, and give liquidity support as long as the profitability of AI at
success is sufficiently high ( 1σ` > RI ≥ <1). However, for <1 > RI , the FI` has no incentive to
continue for the repayment level Y P , because its expected payoff at date 1 is negative.
On the other hand, under the separating strategy, the repayment schedule is given by
Y mR+Z = Y
m
Z = Y
m to minimize the underpricing of the security, as predicted by the “folklore
proposition of debt” in the standard security design literature (Axelson (2007)). If outside
investors know the quality of AI , only the FIm continues and raises new funds because
the FI` prefers liquidation under Assumption 1. In fact, outside investors do not know the
quality of AI . Because the FI receives nothing in liquidation, the FI` may have an incentive
to mimic the FIm. However, if the profitability of AI at success is sufficiently low (<2 > RI >
1
σm ), the expected cash flow received by the FI` in continuation is smaller than its expected
repayment level. Hence, in this case, the FI` prefers to liquidate, while the FIm prefers to
continue. By contrast, if the profitability of AI at success is not sufficiently low ( 1σ` > RI
≥ <2), the FI` has an incentive to mimic the FIm if the repayment level demanded of the
FIm, Y m, is the same as the fair risk-adjusted one, Iσm+(1−σm)σZ . Thus, Y
m must be adjusted
upward until the FI` has no incentive to mimic the FIm. As a result, Y m must be set equal
to σ`Rσ`+(1−σ`)σZ ; and <2 turns out to be the threshold defined above.
Because the FIm knows that its quality of AI is q =m, it may prefer to separate itself from
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the FI`. Hence, the FIm may be more willing to make a higher repayment. However, if the
FI` imitates the FIm that chooses to continue, the FI` incurs only the same repayment to
outside investors that the FIm does. Indeed, whether the pooling or the separating strategy
is used by the FI depends on the profitability of AI at success, RI .
If the profitability of AI at success is sufficiently high ( 1σ` > RI ≥ <1), the repayment level
Y P under the pooling strategy where both the FIm and the FI` continue is sufficiently low
relative to R that the expected payoff of the FI` is nonnegative. As it is very costly for the
FIm to prevent the FI` from mimicking the FIm’s strategy in this range of R
I
, this induces
the FIm to select the pooling strategy.
By contrast, if the profitability of AI at success is not sufficiently high (<1 > RI > 1σm ),
Y P is sufficiently high relative to R that the FI` has no incentive to continue. This rules
out the pooling strategy where both the FIm and the FI` continue. Furthermore, the FIm
always has the greatest incentive to continue, regardless of the repayment level. Thus, the
FI most willing to continue at any repayment level turns out to be the FIm. Under D1
beliefs, if outside investors observe that the FI continues and seeks additional funding with a
repayment level that induces the FI` to liquidate, they believe that the FI is the FIm. This
rules out the pooling strategy where both the FIm and the FI` liquidate AI . Hence, only the
separating strategy survives. In addition, if the profitability of AI at success is sufficiently
low (<2 > RI > 1σm ), the FI` has no incentive to continue for the repayment level Y m that
would prevail if outside investors were able to learn the quality of AI . Thus, in this range,
the FIm need not repay outside investors any premiums in excess of the fair risk-adjusted
level.
The difference between the results of Lemma 2 and the standard signaling model is that
the pooling strategy prevails if R
I
≥ <1. This is because the FI` incurs no additional costs
other than repayment when imitating the FIm that chooses to continue. Hence, the FIm
cannot prevent the imitating strategy of the FI` if R
I
≥ <1.
3.1.3. The continuation/withdrawal decision of the UI If the UI continues, Lemma
1 shows that both the FIm and the FI` continue. However, if the UI withdraws, Lemma 2
suggests that we must examine the following three cases: (i) 1σ` >
R
I
≥ <1; (ii) <1 > RI ≥
<2; and (iii) <2 > RI > 1σm . Then, we obtain the following lemma.21
Lemma 3: Suppose that s = b.
21We assume that the UI chooses to continue if it is indifferent between continuing and withdrawing.
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(i) If 1σ` >
R
I
≥ <1, the UI continues if σbX ≥ I. Otherwise, the UI withdraws.
(ii) If <1 > RI > 1σm , the UI continues if σbX ≥ δI + (1 − δ)L. Otherwise, the UI withdraws.
Intuitively, if the UI continues, both the FIm and the FI` always continue. As the UI does
not know the type of FI at s = b, its interim expected payoff is σbX. On the other hand, if
the UI withdraws, Lemma 2 indicates that the UI expects to receive I if the profitability of
AI at success is sufficiently high ( 1σ` > RI ≥ <1), but only δI + (1 − δ)L if the profitability of
AI at success is not sufficiently high (<1 > RI > 1σm ). Thus, comparing the expected payoff
of the UI in continuation with that in liquidation, we derive the result of Lemma 3.
3.2. The optimal initial security offer of the FI at time 0.–
The arguments in Section 3.1 suggest that the optimal initial security at time 0 depends on
whether the UI continues or withdraws at s = b. In addition, as the Stackelberg leader, the
FI can induce the UI to continue or withdraw at s = b by adjusting the security provisions.
Now, given Lemmas 1—3, we divide the analysis for the optimal initial security offer into
the following three cases: (i) 1σ` >
R
I
≥ <1; (ii) <1 > RI ≥ <2; and (iii) <2 > RI > 1σm . For
each of the above three cases, we further need to take account of two situations: (a) where
the UI is induced to continue at s = b; and (b) where the UI is induced to withdraw at
s = b. By comparing the ex ante expected payoffs of the FI in the two situations, we can
determine the optimal security offer of the FI at time 0 for each of the three cases. In the
proof of Lemma 4 in the Appendix, we formalize the maximization problems and derive the
optimal security offer in each of the three cases.
Lemma 4 characterizes the optimal initial security offer. The following definitions are
useful in stating Lemma 4: ϕ(L) ≡ <1
(1−p)σb{(1 − δ)[p + 2(1 − p)σb]L + δ[p + 2(1 − p)σb] −
σb} and ψ(L) ≡ max(min(ϕ(L),<1),<2),22 where L ≡ LI is the ratio of the liquidation value
of AI to the funding amount of the UI.
Lemma 4: (i) If 1σ` >
R
I
≥ <1, the equilibrium (denoted by IFEP) is determined so that
the FI offers a security at time 0 that induces the UI to withdraw when s = b at time 1. The
optimal initial security is X∗ = I. After the withdrawal of the UI, both the FIm and the
FI ` prefer to continue to invest in AI. The repayment level from the FI to outside investors
in the new security at time 1, Y ∗, is Y ∗ = Iσb+(1−σb)σZ .
(ii) If <1 > RI ≥ ψ(L), the equilibrium (denoted by IFEC) is determined so that the FI offers
22Note that ϕ0(L) > 0 and ϕ(1) > <1.
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a security at time 0 that induces the UI to continue when s = b at time 1. The optimal
initial security is X∗ = δI+(1−δ)Lσb . Both the FIm and the FI ` continue to invest in AI when
s = b at time 1.
(iii) If ψ(L) > R
I
> 1σm , the equilibrium (denoted by IFES) is determined so that the FI
offers a security at time 0 that induces the UI to withdraw when s = b at time 1. The
optimal initial security is X∗ = [1−(1−p)δ]I−(1−p)(1−δ)L
p
. After the withdrawal of the UI, the
FIm continues while the FI ` liquidates. Furthermore, Y ∗ = σ`Rσ`+(1−σ`)σZ if ψ(L) > RI ≥ <2,
and Y ∗ = Iσm+(1−σm)σZ if <2 > RI > 1σm .
If the profitability of AI at success is sufficiently high ( 1σ` > RI ≥ <1), the optimal initial
security induces the UI to withdraw when s = b but causes overinvestment (inefficient con-
tinuation) for the poor earning ability of AI (q = `) because the FI` continues. This implies
that despite the nonrecourse security, liquidity support can arise for q = ` even though the
UI withdraws. This also means that the FI` can raise sufficient funding for the deteriorated
AI in this case. In this sense, capital market pricing does not work well.
If the profitability of AI at success is moderate but is still high enough relative to L (<1
> R
I
≥ ψ(L)), the optimal initial security induces the UI to continue when s = b and causes
overinvestment for q = ` because the FI` continues. Unlike the case of Lemma 4(i), this
inefficiency arises when the UI continues at s = b. In addition, R
I
= ψ(L) is a threshold line
above which the FI induces the UI to continue at s = b in the range R
I
∈ [<2, <1).
If the profitability of AI at success is moderate but is not high enough relative to L (ψ(L)
> R
I
≥ <2) or is sufficiently low (<2 > RI > 1σm ), the optimal initial security induces the
UI to withdraw when s = b and leads to efficient investment for both q = m and q =
` because the FIm continues while the FI` liquidates. Thus, in this case, capital market
pricing works well so that the FI raises new funds only if q = m. However, the FIm must
repay outside investors’ premiums if ψ(L) > R
I
≥ <2, whereas the FIm only needs to repay
outside investors the fair risk-adjusted level if <2 > RI > 1σm .
To summarize, the optimal initial security induces the UI to withdraw when s = b, except
for the case in which the profitability of AI at success is moderate but is still high enough
relative to L (<1 > RI ≥ ψ(L)). Hence, the continuation/liquidation decision of the FI is
given by Lemma 2, except for R
I
∈ [ψ(L), <1). Despite the nonrecourse financing, if the
UI withdraws, the optimal initial security induces the FIm to raise new funds and provide
liquidity support at s = b, while it induces the FI` to raise new funds and give liquidity
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support at s = b only if the profitability of AI at success is sufficiently high ( 1σ` > RI ≥ <1).
The intuition for Lemma 4 is explained as follows. Suppose that the profitability of AI
at success is sufficiently high ( 1σ` > RI ≥ <1). Lemmas 1 and 2(i) show that regardless of
whether the FI induces the UI to continue or withdraw at s = b, the FI always continues
to invest until time 2. To check whether the FI induces the UI to continue or withdraw
at s = b, we need to compare the financing costs of these strategies. If the FI induces the
UI to continue, the FI must increase the face value of the initial security, X, to Iσb , which
guarantees the UI the same interim expected payoff as that from withdrawal. By contrast, if
the FI induces the UI to withdraw, both the FIm and the FI` raise additional funds because
they prefer to continue to invest in this range of R
I
. Thus, the UI can receive the certain
redemption amount of I regardless of q = m or q = `. However, this causes a severe adverse
selection problem in the ex post capital market. Hence, the pooling equilibrium prevails so
that both the FIm and the FI` finance I at time 1 by issuing the same new security with
Y ∗ = Iσb+(1−σb)σZ (see Lemma 2(i)). Indeed, the former cost of the FI inducing the UI to
continue outweighs the latter cost of the FI inducing the UI to withdraw, because the FI
must pay Iσb even at s = g in the former case. Hence, the FI prefers to induce the UI to
withdraw at s = b. Then, the FI can always raise funds and give liquidity support at s = b
so that overinvestment arises for q = `.
Next, suppose that the profitability of AI at success is moderate (<1 > RI ≥ <2). If the FI
induces the UI to continue at s = b, Lemma 1 implies that overinvestment occurs for q = `.
On the other hand, if the FI induces the UI to withdraw at s = b, Lemma 2(ii) indicates that
the FIm continues while the FI` liquidates. Hence, efficient investment is attained. However,
the FIm must repay outside investors’ premiums in excess of the fair risk-adjusted level to
finance the withdrawn funds. To check which strategy the FI chooses, we need to compare
the financing and investment allocation costs of both strategies.
If the FI induces the UI to continue, the FI must increase X to δI+(1−δ)Lσb , which guarantees
the UI the same interim expected payoff as that from withdrawal. Note that even in this
case, the initial security is not necessarily safe; thus, X must be adjusted for the risk.
If the FI induces the UI to withdraw, the FIm must finance I by issuing the new security
with Y ∗ = σ`Rσ`+(1−σ`)σZ at time 1 to separate itself from the FI`. Note that Y
∗ is adjusted for
outside investors’ premiums. On the other hand, the FI` liquidates AI and pays the UI the
liquidation value L. As L is greater than the expected cash flow in continuation, σ`R, under
Assumption 1, the FI can reduce the face value of the initial security X by inducing the UI
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to withdraw and by repaying the UI the certain value of L instead of σ`X when q = `.
Comparing the costs of the above two strategies, we show that if R
I
becomes larger or L
becomes smaller, the face value of the initial security inducing the UI to continue is decreasing
relative to the face value of the initial security inducing the UI to withdraw, whereas the new
security payment of the FI inducing the UI to withdraw is increasing relative to I. Thus, the
cost of inducing the UI to continue is more likely to be lower than the cost of inducing the UI
to withdraw, as R
I
is increasing relative to L. Given the definition of ψ(L), this implies that
in the range of R
I
∈ [<2, <1), the FI induces the UI to continue at s = b if the profitability
of AI at success is moderate but is still high enough relative to L (<1 > RI ≥ ψ(L)); in
contrast, the FI induces the UI to withdraw at s = b if the profitability of AI at success is
moderate but is not high enough relative to L (ψ(L) > R
I
≥ <2).
Finally, suppose that the profitability of AI at success is sufficiently low (<2 > RI > 1σm ).
Then, the argument is similar to that in the case of ψ(L) > R
I
≥ <2. In addition, as discussed
in Lemma 1(iii), the early withdrawal of the UI causes no adverse selection problem in the
ex post capital market in this range of R
I
. Thus, the FIm need not repay any premiums to
finance the withdrawn amount.
4. The Optimality of Nonrecourse Financing
In Section 3, we assumed that the FI can observe the quality of AI at the end of time 0.
Then, Lemma 4 indicates that there may exist a region in which the UI is induced not to
withdraw at s = b. In this section, we first check whether this region can survive if the FI can
choose whether to undertake information acquisition activity. The optimality of nonrecourse
financing can be derived using this result.
4.1. Informed vs. uninformed finance.–
We suppose that the FI cannot observe the quality ofAI at the end of time 0 unless it pays a
positive cost ²I to acquire information at the beginning of time 0. This is because the FI must
develop methodologies and skills and collect information about the borrower to evaluate the
quality of AI . For simplicity, we assume that ²I is an infinitesimally small positive number,
and that the UI and outside investors know whether information acquisition activity is
undertaken.23 Although ²I is not small, the main results in this paper are unaffected.
23This assumption is also used in Winton (2003). As an alternative, and as in Repullo and Suarez (1998),
we may assume that the FI can (contractually) commit to using information technology.
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Because the informed finance equilibrium (IFE) where the FI engages in information ac-
quisition is exactly the same as that explored in Section 3, except that the FI pays ²I at time
0, we need only investigate the uninformed finance equilibrium (UFE) where the FI engages
in no information acquisition. We then obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5: Suppose that the FI does not undertake any information acquisition activity.
(i) Suppose that 1σ` >
R
I
≥ 1σb . The optimal strategies of the FI and the UI under the UFE
are the same as those under the IFEP given by Lemma 4(i).
(ii) Suppose that 1σb >
R
I
> 1σm . Let ΠF0 denote the expected payoff the FI at the beginning
of time 0. Then, the optimal value of ΠF0 is lower than or equal to bΠF0, where bΠF0 ≡ [p +
(1 − p)σb]R + ωZ − I.
If the profitability of AI at success is not substantially low (as in the case of Lemma
5(i)), the UFE definitely causes overinvestment at s = b, in the sense that the FI raises new
funds and continues even when q = `. Further, in the range R
I
, the UFE is the same as the
IFEP given in Lemma 4(i), except that the FI does not pay ²I for information acquisition.
This implies that despite the nonrecourse security, the uninformed FI may provide inefficient
liquidity support at s = b after the UI withdraws. On the other hand, when the profitability
of AI at success is substantially low (as in the case of Lemma 5(ii)), the optimal value of the
expected payoff the FI at the beginning of time 0, ΠF0, is lower than or equal to bΠF0, which
would be attained if the FI were able to commit to continue after the withdrawal of the UI.
The intuition for Lemma 5 is as follows. In the case of Lemma 5(i), the uninformed FI
prefers to continue at s = b, regardless of whether the UI continues or withdraws. The
optimal strategies of the FI and the UI in this case are then the same as those under the
IFEP of Lemma 4(i) because in this range of R
I
, the FI does not use any information on q,
even though it acquires information. In the case of Lemma 5(ii), the withdrawal of the UI
at s = b always forces the uninformed FI to liquidate AI and receive nothing. Hence, the
optimal value of ΠF0 is lower than or equal to bΠF0.
Inspecting the ex ante expected payoff of the FI attained in each case of Lemmas 4 and
5, we establish the following lemma about the configuration of the IFE and the UFE.
Lemma 6: Define φ(L) ≡ [δ + (1 − δ)L]<1.
(i) If 1σ` >
R
I
≥ max(φ(L),<2), the equilibrium is given by the UFE that is characterized by
Lemma 5(i).
(ii) If max(φ(L),<2) > RI ≥ 1σm , the equilibrium is given by the IFES, which is characterized
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by Lemma 4(iii).
Figure 2 illustrates the configuration of the equilibrium given by Lemma 6 with various
regions of the parameter space (as depicted by the parameters L and R
I
) where the UFE or
the IFES prevails.24
The intuition for this lemma is as follows. Under Assumption 5(ii), note that <2 > 1σb .
Suppose that the profitability of AI at success is sufficiently high ( 1σ` > RI ≥ <1). In this
case, regardless of whether or not the FI acquires information, it always sets X∗ = I and
continues to invest in AI although the UI is induced to withdraw the fund at s = b (see
Lemmas 4(i) and 5(i)). The reason is that investment in AI is worth continuing because RI
is sufficiently high and the FI receives nothing in liquidation. As the information obtained
by the FI need not be used in the range of R
I
, the FI does not acquire information in order
to save the information acquisition cost. As a result, uninformed finance prevails.
Next, suppose that the profitability of AI at success is moderate but relatively higher than
L (<1 > RI ≥ ψ(L)). If the FI acquires information in this range, it is always optimal for the
FI to induce the UI to continue investment because R
I
is relatively higher than L and the
FI receives nothing in liquidation (see Lemma 4(ii)). As a result, the FI must raise the face
value of the initial security, X, to compensate the UI for the default risk borne when the
UI continues to invest. Under uninformed finance, however, the FI can commit to induce
the UI to withdraw the fund so that the FI need not pay the increment in X (see Lemma
5(i)). Under Assumption 5(i), we can show that the possibility of the FI inducing the UI to
continue under informed finance is ruled out by uninformed finance.
We now suppose that the profitability of AI at success is moderate but is not as high as
L (ψ(L) > R
I
≥ <2). In this case, whether or not informed finance prevails depends on the
benefit and cost of the separating strategy chosen by the FI after it observes q at s = b (see
Lemma 4(iii)). The separating strategy creates the benefit of the efficient investment for
both q = m and q = ` because the FI always induces the UI to withdraw the fund at s =
b, and raises new funds and provides liquidity support only if q = m. On the other hand,
there are two costs in the separating strategy. The FI needs to determine the face value of
the initial security, X, by considering that the FIm continues to invest in AI while the FI`
liquidates AI . Given L < I, this implies that the separating strategy sets X higher than
24Given that φ(1) = <1, φ−1(<2) > σ`σm and φ(L◦) = <2, where L
◦
σ` = φ(L◦), Figure 2 is drawn by assuming
L◦ < σbσm . In addition, note that RI = φ(L) is included in the region {(L, RI ) | 1σbL < RI < 1σ`L and <2 < RI
< <1} for L ∈ (L◦, 1). This is because φ0(L) = (1 − δ)<1 ∈ (0, 1σ` ), φ(L◦) = <2 and φ(1) = <1.
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I in this region. Furthermore, the FIm must repay outside investors’ premiums in excess
of the fair risk-adjusted level to separate itself from the FI` in the ex post capital market.
The benefit of the efficient investment, however, is more likely to outweigh the costs of the
increments of the initial face value and the repayment in the ex post capital market when L
is large or R
I




Finally, if the profitability of AI at success is sufficiently low (<2 > RI ≥ 1σm ), the FIm
need not pay any premiums to finance the withdrawn funds in the ex post capital market
(see Lemma 4(iii)). Informed finance always prevails in this region because the benefit of
the efficient investment always outweighs the incremental cost of the initial face value.
Using Lemmas 4—6 with Figure 2, we now establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1: If the FI can choose whether to undertake information acquisition activity,
the equilibrium is characterized as follows.
(i) The FI always offers an initial security that induces the UI to withdraw when s = b.
(ii) The FI undertakes no information acquisition, provides inefficient liquidity support, and
overinvests if the profitability of AI at success is not sufficiently small relative to L ( 1σ` > RI
≥ max(φ(L),<2)). Otherwise, the FI undertakes information acquisition, provides efficient
liquidity support, and invests efficiently.
Proposition 1 suggests that if the FI can choose whether to acquire information, the
optimal initial security always induces the UI to withdraw early at s = b and forces the FI
to determine whether to raise new funds in order to give liquidity support. The intuition is
that if the FI commits to acquire information, there is a region of (L, R
I
) where the UI does
not prefer to withdraw early at s = b because the FI` then liquidates AI . In this region, the
FI needs to increase the face value of the initial security to compensate the UI for the default
risk arising when the UI continues. However, in this region, if the FI does not attempt to
acquire information, the FI can commit to pay the UI the certain redemption amount of I,
raise new funds, and continue investment in AI after the withdrawal of the UI. Then, the
FI can avoid compensating the UI for the default risk arising when the UI continues. Thus,
if the FI can choose whether to acquire information, in this region, the FI prefers not to
acquire information, and induces the UI to withdraw early at s = b to prevent the face value
25 R
I = φ(L) is a threshold line below which the former benefit outweighs the latter costs. Note that ϕ(L)
> φ(L), φ(1) = <1, and φ0(L) > 0. Thus, min(ϕ(L),<1) > φ(L) for any L ∈ (0, 1).
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of the initial security from increasing.
Proposition 1 also indicates that if the profitability of AI at success is not sufficiently small
relative to L ( 1σ` > RI ≥ max(φ(L),<2)), inefficient maturity mismatch (inefficient early
withdrawal) arises. Despite the nonrecourse security, the FI` provides liquidity support and
continues to invest in AI . Intuitively, as the FI does not undertake information acquisition
activity in the region, it does not know its own quality. However, the uninformed FI can
raise sufficient funds for the devalued AI at s = b. Thus, there is inefficient liquidity support
and overinvestment for q = ` when s = b. Conversely, if the profitability of AI at success is
not sufficiently small relative to L (max(φ(L),<2) > RI > 1σm ), the optimal initial security
provides a liquidity threat that not only leads to efficient liquidity support and investment
decision by the FI but also enhances information acquisition by the FI.
According to Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Flannery (1994), and Diamond and Rajan
(2001), the mismatch in the maturity structure or the possibility of the early withdrawal
of lenders serves as a commitment device to discipline commercial banks. These studies
show that demand deposits are a way of reassuring investors in a commercial bank that
their investments will not be too badly expropriated by bank management. Conversely,
Stein (2005) finds that mutual and hedge funds allow early withdrawals (equivalent to open
ending) in an attempt to signal the skill of the funds’ managers. However, because both
high-quality and low-quality managers are forced to open end, the resulting equilibrium is
pooling, where all funds choose an open-end form and an inefficient investment strategy.
Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2010) also derive the optimality of excessively short-term fi-
nancing under the possibility of early withdrawal of lenders, although short-term financing
forces lenders to be exposed to unnecessary liquidation.
In contrast to the existing literature, in our model, whether the maturity mismatch causes
inefficiency depends on the parameter values of R
I
and L. If the profitability of AI at success
is not sufficiently small relative to L ( 1σ` > RI ≥ max(φ(L),<2)), the maturity mismatch
causes inefficient liquidity support and overinvestment because the equilibrium is pooling, as
indicated in Stein (2005). Otherwise, the maturity mismatch brings about efficient liquidity
support and investment because it serves as a commitment device to discipline the FI, as
suggested in Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Flannery (1994), and Diamond and Rajan (2001).
Although the Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2010) model causes excessive liquidation, this
result depends on their rat-race framework in which, given that all other lenders are only
providing short-term financing, it is not individually rational for the financial institution to
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move an individual creditor to a longer maturity. Further, in their setting, there exists no
ex post capital market after the withdrawal of creditors.
4.2. Optimality of the initial security backed by the cash flow of AI alone.–
We initially assumed that the FI could pledge only the cash flow of AI at time 0. To
justify this, we assumed that prior to time 0, the FI issued the old security backed by the
cash flow of AO to finance the FI’s other urgent or opaque liquidity needs. In its place, the
FI may repurchase the existing old security issued prior to time 0 and sell at time 0 an initial
security backed by the cash flows of AI and AO to raise both I and the repurchase payment.
This is equivalent to assuming that the FI can pledge the cash flows of both AI and AO at
time 0. This type of initial security issued at time 0 and backed by the cash flows of AI and
AO can be regarded as an alternative to the initial security issued at time 0 and backed by
the cash flow of AI alone, which has been considered in the previous discussions.
If the FI issues this initial security at time 0 backed by the cash flows of AI and AO to
raise both I and the repurchase payment, we can assume that the initial security matures
at time 1 and that the FI decides whether to roll it over at time 1. As the FI’s other urgent
or opaque liquidity needs disappear at time 1, the FI only needs to finance the amount I
when rolling over the initial security at time 1. The initial security introduced above is then
essentially equivalent to the security offered by the FI to the UI at the beginning of time 0
so that the UI provides I and requires a repayment X at time 2 if AI and AO yield a cash
flow R + Z, a repayment X 0 at time 2 if AI and AO yield Z, and no repayment at time 2 if
AI and AO yield no cash flow. Note that R + Z ≥ X ≥ 0 and Z ≥ X 0 ≥ 0.
Under this type of initial security, suppose that the UI withdraws and the FI liquidates AI
at time 1. However, the liquidation value of AI , L, cannot cover the redemption amount, I,
under Assumption 1. Thus, when the FI pledges the cash flows of both AI and AO, it must
liquidate AO to repay the remaining amount I − L unless it raises new funds in the ex post
capital market. In fact, the liquidation value of AO equals 0, whereas the expected cash flow
of AO at s = b is larger than I − L even for q = ` if [σ` + (1 − σ`)σZ ]Z > I − L. This
last condition is satisfied under Assumption 4. Thus, when the FI liquidates AI at time 1,
it prefers to avoid the liquidation of AO because it cannot receive anything if it liquidates
AO. Hence, the FI must issue at time 1 a new security backed by the cash flow of AO and
finance I − L to avoid the liquidation of AO.
Given these modifications, repeating the arguments for s= g at the beginning of Section 3.1
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and the arguments in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, we show the following lemma that corresponds
to Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 7: Suppose that the FI undertakes information acquisition activity. Under the
initial security backed by the cash flows of both AI and AO, the optimal strategies of the FI
at time 1 are characterized as follows.
(i) If the UI continues to invest in AI at time 1, the FI continues to invest in AI for any s.
(ii) Suppose that the UI withdraws at time 1.
(a) Suppose that s = g. Then, the FI continues to invest in AI .
(b) Suppose that s = b. (α) If 1σ` > RI ≥ <1L, both the FIm and the FI ` continue to invest
in AI . The repayment level from the FI to outside investors in the capital market is Y P
= Iσb+(1−σb)σZ . (β) If <1L > RI ≥ 1σm , the FIm continues to invest in AI while the FI `
liquidates AI. The repayment level from the FI ` to outside investors in the capital market
is Y ` = I−Lσ`+(1−σ`)σZ . The repayment level from the FIm to outside investors in the capital
market is Y mR+Z = Y
m
Z = Y
m: Y m = σ`R+I−Lσ`+(1−σ`)σZ if <1L > RI ≥ max (<2 − 1−Lσ` , 1σm ); and
Y m = Iσm+(1−σm)σZ if max (<2 − 1−Lσ` , 1σm ) > RI > 1σm .
Because 1 > L, the possibility of both the FIm and the FI` raising new funds and con-
tinuing to invest in AI after the withdrawal of the UI at s = b is more likely to occur if the
initial security is backed by the cash flows of both AI and AO instead of AI alone. Intuitively,
even if the FI liquidates AI at time 1 when the initial security is backed by both AI and
AO, it does not prefer to liquidate AO to repay the insufficient amount I − L. Thus, the FI
issues the new security backed by AO and finances I − L. As the probability of AO yielding
R is larger for q = m than for q = `, this new security issue further strengthens the FI`’s
imitating incentive, thus making it more expensive for the FIm to separate itself from the
FI`. As a result, under the recourse security, the pooling equilibrium strategy arises in a
broader region after the withdrawal of the UI because it is more costly for the FI` to liquidate
AI. Backing the security with other assets of the FI is thus more likely to induce the FI` to
continue investing in AI at time 1 after the UI withdraws. As shown below, this implies that
the recourse security would raise the FI’s borrowing costs when the FI can choose whether
to acquire information.
Next, applying the arguments for s = g at the beginning of Section 3.1 and the arguments
in Section 3.1.3, and using the results of Lemma 7, we show the following lemma that
corresponds to Lemma 3.
29
Lemma 8: Suppose that the FI undertakes information acquisition activity. Under the
initial security backed by the cash flows of both AI and AO, the optimal strategies of the UI
at time 1 are presented as follows.
(i) Suppose that s = g. Then, the UI always continues.
(ii) Suppose that s = b. Then, the UI continues if σbX + (1 − σb)X 0 ≥ I. Otherwise, the
UI withdraws.
Note that the UI receives I even at the liquidation of AI because the FI must avoid the
liquidation of AO in this security. Hence, the UI can always obtain I when withdrawing.
Now, using arguments similar to those of Lemma 4, the configuration of the IFE under the
initial security backed by both AI and AO is given by a form similar to the configuration of
the IFEP, IFEC, and IFES indicated by Lemma 4. In fact, for the region corresponding to
the IFEC of Lemma 4, recourse financing may be optimal. Intuitively, if the initial security
is backed by the cash flows of both AI and AO instead of AI alone, it reduces the bankruptcy
possibility at time 2 if the UI is induced to continue investing when s = b (as in the region
corresponding to the IFEC of Lemma 4). Such a reduction of the bankruptcy possibility at
time 2 relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint to ensure that the UI continues, thereby
leading to a reduction of the FI’s initial promised repayment when s = g and lowering its
borrowing costs. Thus, if the FI need not raise additional funds in the capital market at
s = b because the UI continues investing at s = b, the decline in the FI’s borrowing costs
may make recourse financing advantageous.
To exclude the above possibility, we again assume that the FI can choose whether to
undertake information acquisition activity. First, repeating arguments similar to those used
to derive Lemma 5, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 9: The optimal value of ΠF0 under uninformed finance when an initial security is
backed by the cash flows of both AI and AO is equal to bΠF0 if RI ≥ Lσb ; otherwise, it is lower
than or equal to bΠF0, where bΠF0 ≡ [p + (1 − p)σb]R + ωZ − I.
Intuitively, under uninformed finance in this case, the FI continues after the withdrawal
of the UI if and only if σbR − I ≥ −(I −L); that is, σbR ≥ L. This is because the FI must
raise the amount I −L to avoid the liquidation of AO when liquidating AI . Then, repeating
arguments similar to those used in Lemma 5, we obtain the result of this lemma.
Using Lemmas 7—9, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2: If the FI can choose whether to undertake information acquisition activity,
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the initial security backed by the cash flow of AI alone dominates the initial security backed
by the cash flows of both AI and AO.
Intuitively, the initial security backed by both AI and AO makes it more difficult for the
FI` to liquidate AI at s = b. The reason is that if the FI liquidates AI , it must issue the
new security backed by AO and finance I − L to avoid the liquidation of AO. However, this
strengthens the FI`’s imitating incentive, which forces the FIm to issue the more underpriced
security to separate itself from the FI`. On the other hand, because the initial security
backed by AI alone makes AI remote from AO, it enables the FI to avoid the liquidation of
AO without the issue of any new security when liquidating AI . This makes liquidation of AI
more attractive for the FI`, which knows that AI is bad. In fact, the initial security backed
by both AI and AO can reduce the bankruptcy possibility at time 2 relative to the initial
security backed by AI alone if the UI continues investment at s = b. This effect reduces
the expected initial promised repayment of the FI by relaxing the incentive compatibility
constraint that ensures that the UI continues. However, the latter effect does not exist as
long as the UI withdraws at s = b. The reason is that the individual rationality constraint
to ensure that the UI can recover its funding amount I must then be binding, instead of
the incentive compatibility constraint to ensure that the UI withdraws. Then, the expected
initial promised repayment of the FI cannot be reduced because it must be set equal to I.
Hence, if we compare the benefits of the recourse security with those of the nonrecourse
security, the benefits of reducing the bankruptcy possibility under the recourse security are
dominated by those of relaxing the FI`’s imitating incentives under the nonrecourse security.
Thus, the commitment provided by recourse financing is harmful because it affords the FI`
more incentives to continue investing in AI at s = b and causes the inefficient allocation
of investment, although it may reduce the possibility of bankruptcy at time 2. Thus, the
FI’s ex ante expected payoff will be lower under the recourse security. By establishing
bankruptcy remoteness, the nonrecourse security allows the FI to commit to more efficient
decisions on whether to liquidate or continue AI . As a result, even though the FI may
finance additional funds and provide liquidity support to AI afterward, the nonrecourse
security becomes optimal in the first place.
This logic is similar to that of Inderst and Mueller (2010), who examine the optimal CEO
compensation and replacement policy when the CEO privately observes an interim signal
about the likely firm value under his continued leadership and when the CEO turnover must
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be incentive compatible from the CEO’s perspective. The CEO’s desire to continue to hold
his position, together with his private information at the interim stage, creates a wedge
between efficient CEO replacement and actual CEO turnover. Steep incentive and severance
pay can mitigate such CEO entrenchment because it makes continuation unattractive for
“bad” CEOs. The nonrecourse security in our model plays a role similar to that of the steep
incentive and severance pay in Inderst and Mueller, in the sense that it makes continuation
of investment in AI unattractive for the FI`.
Proposition 2 reveals a novel aspect of the security design of the financial institution:
namely, the institution should initially issue a security backed by a particular investment
asset instead of its total assets to resolve the overinvestment problem. This novel aspect
is crucially dependent on three features: (i) the possibility of maturity mismatch (or early
withdrawal), (ii) information asymmetry, and (iii) the endogenous choice of information
acquisition. Note that the FI prefers recourse financing unless the first two features exist.
The reason is that recourse financing then does not strengthen the FI`’s imitating incentive,
but reduces the FI’s borrowing costs through a reduction in the bankruptcy possibility at
time 2. Further, if the FI commits to acquiring information, nonrecourse financing may not
be optimal for R
I
∈ [ψ(L), <1), when the UI is induced to continue investment in AI at s =
b (see Lemma 4(ii)). This is because, in this case, the FI need not raise additional funds at
s = b. Again, recourse financing does not tighten the FI`’s imitating incentive, but reduces
the FI’s borrowing costs through a decrease in the bankruptcy possibility at time 2.
Benveniste and Berger (1987) and Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995) indicate that either the
exogenous recourse or the capital constraint on the original bank is a key factor in explaining
the role of asset-backed lending. On the other hand, the logic of Proposition 2 makes it clear
that the optimality of nonrecourse financing of securitization is endogenously derived and is
interrelated with not only the maturity structure of the FI and the information asymmetry,
but also the FI’s information acquisition activity.
Ayotte and Gaon (2011) discuss securitization by focusing on the special protection pro-
vided by ‘bankruptcy remoteness’ to distinguish asset-backed securities (ABS) from secured
or unsecured debt. They suggest that in bankruptcy, the debtor-in-possession (DIP) lender
can transfer sufficient wealth from existing unsecured creditors through dilution of their
claims by issuing senior claims. Ayotte and Gaon show that ABS protect ABS investors
from the DIP lender in bankruptcy and can prevent inefficient continuation of the firm.
However, they do not allow ABS investors to withdraw early, nor do they examine the ad-
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verse selection issues. Proposition 2 highlights the role of the nonrecourse security that
mitigates the adverse selection incentive for the FI` in the ex post capital market when the
UI withdraws early.26
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) argue that the process of pooling and
tranching in securitization alleviates the underpricing involved in the asset sale, because
it enhances risk diversification and prevents informed intermediaries from exploiting unin-
formed investors under the ex post signaling model. In fact, these papers do not consider
the early withdrawal of uninformed investors, nor do they consider the additional financ-
ing possibility of informed intermediaries. Alternatively, Proposition 2 suggests that the
nonrecourse property of securitization mitigates the underpricing involved in the additional
financing by the FI after the UI withdraws.
Gorton and Souleles (2006) discuss the possibility of liquidity support by a sponsor for
its SPV in securitization in certain states of the world, even though it is not legally bound
to do so. They suggest that the sponsor colludes with investors in the SPV by agreeing to
the implicit state-contingent subsidization in a repeated game context. In this paper, the FI
provides liquidity support for AI , even in a static context if it is ex post optimal for the FI
to do so when the UI withdraws at time 1. However, if the profitability of AI at success is
not sufficiently small relative to L ( 1σ` > RI ≥ max(φ(L),<2)), inefficient liquidity support
and overinvestment occur, even in the case of the nonrecourse security.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we establish the following corollary.
Corollary to Propositions 1 and 2: If the FI can choose whether to undertake infor-
mation acquisition activity, the nonrecourse financing of securitization dominates traditional
bank loans with deposit claims backed by the bank’s total assets. However, inefficient liquidity
support and overinvestment arise despite the nonrecourse property of the security, as long as
the profitability of AI at success is not sufficiently small relative to L.
To summarize, the nonrecourse financing of securitization may be used even though not
only regulatory and ratings arbitrage, but also the low-interest-rate environment are alle-
26Proposition 2 also provides a different aspect of securitization from Bolton and Freixas (2000). They
assume the priority of bank debt over bonds and suggest that the priority structure invokes excessive liqui-
dation because the bank’s priority can be maintained only if the firm is liquidated. Securitization in their
model arises to remove the undesirable effects of priority structure by making the bank’s claim junior to
the claims of asset-backed security holders. By contrast, in our model, the priority structure creates the
overinvestment problem, as in Ayotte and Gaon (2011). Proposition 2 suggests that under adverse selection
problems, asset-backed securities with a nonrecourse property are more likely to motivate the institution to
liquidate its deteriorated assets, and are thus more likely to alleviate the overinvestment problem.
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viated. This result also holds notwithstanding that the FI may provide liquidity support
afterward.
4.3. Comparative statics.–
We conduct a comparative static analysis. The variables in which we are interested are
the profitability of AI at success, RI , the ratio of the liquidation value of AI to the funding
amount of the UI, L, the asset quality of AI , (σm,σ`), and the asset quality of AO, σZ .
Proposition 3: If the FI can choose whether to undertake information acquisition activity,
the UFE–where the FI undertakes no information acquisition, provides inefficient liquidity
support, and overinvests–is more likely to occur, the larger is R
I
, the smaller is L, the larger
is σm, the larger is σ`, or the smaller is σZ.
Proposition 3 suggests that the UFE is more likely to occur when the profitability of AI
at success increases or when the liquidation value of AI decreases relative to the funds raised
from the UI or when the asset quality of AI (or AO) is expected to be higher (lower).
The intuition for this proposition is as follows. The results of R
I
and L depend on the FI`
continuing (or liquidating) at s = b in the UFE (or the IFES) in Lemma 6. This implies
that an increase in R increases the ex ante expected payoff of the FI, Π∗F0, in the UFE
more than Π∗F0 in the IFES. Hence, the FI is less likely to acquire information, the larger
is R
I
. By contrast, when L is smaller, Π∗F0 in the IFES decreases while Π∗F0 in the UFE is
unchanged. Hence, the FI is less likely to acquire information, as L is smaller. A rise in σm
or σ` increases Π∗F0 in the UFE more than Π∗F0 in the IFES. This is because a rise in σm
or σ` reduces the FI’s repayment to outside ex post capital market investors in the UFE by
making it easier for the FI to assure outside investors of their reservation payoff, whereas
a rise in σ` increases the FIm’s repayment in the IFES by making it more difficult for the
FIm to separate itself from the FI`. On the other hand, an increase in σZ decreases the FI’s
repayment to outside investors in the IFES more than that in the UFE by mitigating the
adverse selection problem. This reduces the likelihood of the UFE.
5. Empirical Implications
5.1. Securitized and structured finance.–
Asset-backed securities are one of the most significant financial innovations of recent
decades. In particular, a growing number of commercial and investment banks issue struc-
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tured finance products such as MBSs and CDOs into which mortgages and other loans are
pooled. The portfolios of the products are usually transferred to off-balance-sheet vehicles.
In these products, the securitized claims on the pool’s payments are carved into various
‘tranches’ or classes of risk, for example, senior, mezzanine and equity tranches. The major-
ity of buyers of senior tranches are institutional investors, while parts of the lower tranches
are sold to high-yield-seeking investors, such as hedge funds. Recently, in order to sell some
parts of the senior tranches, banks have acted as sponsors of ABCP programs by letting
off-balance-sheet vehicles–ABCP conduits and SIVs–issue short-term maturity paper in
the form of ABCP.27
As ABCP conduits invest in illiquid long-maturity assets and issue short-maturity paper,
sponsoring banks typically provide credit enhancement and/or liquidity support to their con-
duits. Indeed, the majority of ABCP conduits have liquidity lines committed by sponsoring
banks for the full amount of outstanding CP. Hence, if the ABCP conduits face liquidity
needs such that their issued CP is to be forcibly repurchased, they will need to be funded
by the sponsoring banks. SIVs are similar to ABCP conduits. The difference is that SIVs
operate with much less liquidity support and have substantially more stringent rules of op-
eration.28 In fact, sponsoring banks are often forced to support the SIV financially even
though they are legally separate entities. As a result, ABCP investors are in most cases
insulated from market value risk. If an ABCP conduit or SIV cannot roll over its maturing
paper, and liquidity drawdowns are thus made to the full extent of the CP outstanding, the
sponsoring bank is forced to provide funding support and becomes the sole funding provider.
Because a large number of agents are involved in ABCP programs and are unknown to the
sponsoring banks, the renegotiation of ABCP programs is practically impossible.29
In our model, the sponsoring bank, ABCP investors, and MBSs and CDOs or their original
assets are interpreted as the FI, the UI, and the investment asset AI , respectively. Off-
balance-sheet vehicles and their financing strategy of borrowing using short-term paper are
also viewed as the nonrecourse and short-maturity properties of the initial security issued by
27ABCP conduits are bankruptcy-remote SPVs established by sponsoring banks and are funded through
the issuance of ABCP to finance the purchase of MBSs and CDOs. An SPV is a legal entity created by a
sponsor or originator by transferring assets to the SPV. Its sole purpose is to collect principal and interest
cash flows from the underlying assets and pass them to the owners of the various tranches.
28SIVs also issue medium-term notes and capital notes, which are generally ranked lowest in order of
repayment and have a longer maturity. Sponsoring banks usually invest in capital notes.
29For details of the issues discussed here, see FitchRatings (September 12, 2007), BearStearns (August 9,
2007), IMF (October, 2007), IMF (December, 2007), Gorton (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), and Coval, Jurek
and Stafford (2009).
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the FI. In addition, liquidity support to conduits or SIVs by sponsoring banks is regarded
as the liquidity support of the FI. The inability of the market to identify and quantify
precisely what losses lie in the MBSs and CDOs or their original assets corresponds to
the information structure of the participating agents in our model. Because the potential
profitability of the original assets such as subprime (or alternative-A) mortgages and credit
card, auto, and buyout loans is sufficiently high, Proposition 3 (or Lemma 6) suggests that the
equilibrium is located in the UFE region in Figure 2. Hence, the inefficient liquidity support
and overinvestment problems can arise because sponsoring banks with deteriorated assets
are expected to continue to invest in MBSs and CDOs or the original assets. This tendency
is strengthened further if the liquidation value of MBSs and CDOs decreases as a result of
the decline in the original assets. Moreover, this kind of equilibrium is more likely to occur,
as the repayment likelihood of original asset loan borrowers is ex ante expected to be higher.
In recent years, two institutional and structural features have also played an important role
in the likelihood of the occurrence of this kind equilibrium. One is regulatory and ratings
arbitrage, whereby sponsoring banks took most of their risky loans off their balance sheets
so as not to hold costly capital against them.30 The other is a low-interest-rate environment,
in which securitized and structured products enjoyed popularity among portfolio managers
because many were ‘searching for yield’. These features further strengthened the occurrence
of equilibrium with inefficient liquidity support and overinvestment.
5.2. Securitization by federal mortgage agencies.–
The federal mortgage agencies (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) issue MBSs (such as the
Gold Participate Certificate by Freddie Mac). They also act as sponsors for structured
mortgage products (such as the real estate mortgage investment conduits program by Fred-
die Mac), referred to as collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), in which cash flows
from the underlying assets are allocated to tranches of varying maturities, coupons, and
payment priorities. Because CMOs are backed by MBSs guaranteed by these agencies, the
securitization involves a liquidity problem similar to that in Section 5.1.
6. Extensions and Robustness Checks
6.1. Optimality of the short-term debt.–
30For the effect of existing regulations on the quality of mortgage loan originations, see Keys et al. (2009).
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If the FI can choose to offer an initial security that prevents the UI from withdrawing
at time 1, the FI need not consider the incentive compatibility constraint for the UI with
respect to whether the UI withdraws its funds at time 1. Even in this case, we can show
that this initial security is dominated by a security that allows the UI to withdraw at time
1. The reason is that if the UI cannot withdraw until time 2, Lemma 1 suggests that the FI
always chooses to continue. Thus, we can show that the ex ante expected payoff of the FI
is equal to bΠF0 given in Lemma 5 or 9, regardless of whether the initial security is backed
by the cash flow of AI alone or of both AI and AO (see the Appendix).31 Hence, all of the
propositions and lemmas in Sections 3 and 4 continue to hold.
6.2. Optimality of the new security backed by both AI and AO at time 1.–
Even if the FI issues a new security backed by AO alone at time 1, it follows from Assump-
tion 4 that the possibility of bankruptcy of the FIm or FI` in the new security is exactly
the same as in the new security issued at time 1 and backed by AI and AO. In addition,
in both new securities, the bankruptcy case is equivalent to the case where no cash flow
is generated. Hence, we can exclude the new security backed by AO alone without loss of
generality. However, the FI may issue a new security backed by AI alone at time 1, just like
the initial security. This type of new security increases the likelihood of default of the FI`
more than that of the FIm. In the pooling case, this change increases the expected payoff
of the FI` but decreases that of the FIm. In the separating case, this change tightens the
incentive compatibility constraint for the FI` and reduces the expected payoff of the FIm,
although it does not affect the expected payoff of the FI`.32 These arguments show that out-
side investors with D1 beliefs consider the FI to be the FI` if the FI offers the new security
backed by AI alone at time 1 in the pooling equilibrium, and that the FIm has no incentive
to offer the new security backed by AI alone at time 1 in the separating equilibrium.
31In fact, if 1σ` >
R
I ≥ max(φ(L),<2), the expected payoff of the FI at time 0 under the long-term debt is
the same as that under the short-term debt. However, there are several reasons why the short-term debt has
additional advantages. First, the UI prefers the short-term maturity. For example, if the UI is faced with
liquidity needs when s = b, it may have to reserve funds at time 1. Then, if the UI can satisfy its liquidity
needs using the withdrawn funds, the FI can reduce compensation for the UI’s cash hoarding costs by issuing
short-term debt. Second, in this range of RI , the face value of the long-term debt must be larger than that of
the short-term debt because the UI can always recover the investment funds under the short-term debt. If
R is not large enough to cover the face value of the long-term debt, this would be an additional advantage of
the short-term security. Finally, several studies suggest the role of the short-term debt in reassuring investors
in a bank that they will not be too badly expropriated by bank managers (see Calomiris and Kahn (1991),
Flannery (1994), and Diamond and Rajan (2001)).
32Note that the effect on the FI’s borrowing cost for the new security is different from that for the initial
security because the FI knows its own AI .
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6.3. Nonoptimality of the FI repurchasing the initial security at time 1.–
Without loss of generality, we focus on the case of s = b. We also restrict ourselves to the
case of informed finance because under Assumption 2, the FI has no incentive to buy back
the security at time 1 in order to liquidate AI if it has no private information on q.
If at time 1 the FI repurchases the initial security backed by AI , the UI must at least be
assured of the interim expected payoff attained when withdrawing. Otherwise, the UI rejects
the repurchase offer and withdraws or continues. Hence, given the FI’s strategy derived in




ψ(L), it is I; and (ii) if ψ(L) > R
I
> 1σm , it is δI + (1 − δ)L. In both cases, the FI` has no
incentive to repurchase the security at time 1 because I > δI + (1 − δ)L > L > σ`R. With
the expectation that only the FIm will repurchase the security, the UI requires at least I.
Whichever case occurs, neither the FIm nor the FI` has any positive incentive to repurchase
the security.
7. Conclusion
This paper explored the role of nonrecourse financing of securitization by an FI. In equi-
librium, even though the FI may provide liquidity support afterward, a security with a
nonrecourse property backed by a particular FI asset is ex ante preferred to any security
backed by all of its assets (such as deposit claims), because the nonrecourse security makes
liquidation of the original asset more attractive for an FI that knows that the original assets
are bad. Furthermore, it is also optimal for the FI to offer a security that induces the early
withdrawal of uninformed investors when uninformed investors learn that future economic
conditions will be bad. However, uninformed finance, inefficient liquidity support, and over-
investment are more likely to arise if the profitability of the asset at the high revenue state
increases or if the liquidation value of the asset decreases relative to the amount funded
by outside initial uninformed investors or if the likelihood of success with the asset invest-
ment increases. The theoretical results have empirical implications for recent problems with
securitized and structured finance in the United States and Europe.
However, the application of our model is not necessarily restricted to the issue of securi-
tization. For example, in the Japanese main bank system following the end of the 1990s,
non-main banks withdrew their funds early when they suspected that the borrowing firms
were likely to become financially distressed. Whether the withdrawal of non-main banks can
provide a threat that disciplines the misbehavior of the main bank is an empirical issue.
38
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: We first examine the pooling strategy of the FI.33
Lemma A1: Under the pooling strategy, both the FIm and the FI ` prefer to continue to
invest in AI if and only if RI ≥ <1. The repayment level, Y P , is Y P = Iσb+(1−σb)σZ .
Proof of Lemma A1: In this case, both the FIm and the FI` use the same strategy.
We subsequently solve for the equilibrium Y P by assuming that Z ≥ Y P holds, and then we
verify that the equilibrium value of Y P really satisfies Z ≥ Y P . Suppose that both the FIm
and the FI` continue. If Z ≥ Y P , the interim expected payoff obtained by the FI with q (or
by outside investors), ΠPF2(q) (or ΠPO2), under the pooling strategy is ΠPF2(q) = σq(R − Y P
+ Z) + (1 − σq)σZ(Z − Y P ) (or ΠPO2 =P
q
δq[σq + (1 − σq)σZ ]Y P ), where δm = δ and δ`




δq[σq + (1− σq)σZ ]. It follows from the participation constraint for outside




σb+(1−σb)σZ . Under Assumption
4, this Y P satisfies the condition Z ≥ Y P . Substituting Y P into ΠPF2(q) yields
ΠPF2(q) = σqR+ [σq + (1− σq)σZ ]Z − σq + (1− σq)σZσb + (1− σb)σZ I. (A1)
Now, suppose that the FI with q liquidates AI . Because the FI’s claim is junior, we have
ΠPF2(q) = [σq + (1− σq)σZ ]Z. (A2)
Comparing (A1) and (A2), we show that the FI with q prefers to continue as long as R ≥
σq+(1−σq)σZ
σq [σb+(1−σb)σZ ]I ≡ ψ(σq). Because σm > σ`, we obtain ψ(σ`) > ψ(σm). As both the FIm and
the FI` make the same choice under the pooling strategy, they prefer to continue after the
withdrawal of the UI under the pooling strategy if and only if R
I
≥ <1. k
Because the situation where both the FIm and the FI` prefer to liquidate AI after the
UI withdraws is the residual case in which neither the pooling strategy with continuation
nor the separating strategy is chosen, we proceed to discuss the separating strategy. Indeed,
outside investors demand at least Iσ`+(1−σ`)σZ of the FI` if they know that the FI is the FI`.
However, the expected payoff of the FI` is then larger in liquidation than in continuation
33We assume that the FI chooses to continue if it has no preference between continuing and liquidating.
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because [σ` + (1 − σ`)σZ ]Z > σ`[R + Z − Iσ`+(1−σ`)σZ ] + (1 − σ`)σZ [Z − Iσ`+(1−σ`)σZ ] under
Assumption 1. This implies that if the separating strategy is possible, the FIm continues
while the FI` liquidates. Thus, outside investors can perfectly infer the innate value of their
debt claim from the decision by the FI to continue or liquidate under the separating strategy.
Now, we have the following lemma.
Lemma A2: Under the separating strategy, the FIm continues to invest in AI while
the FI ` liquidates AI. The repayment schedule is given by Y mR+Z = Y
m
Z = Y






≥ <2; and Y m = Iσm+(1−σm)σZ if RI < <2. No other
separating strategy is viable.
Proof of Lemma A2: We only need to prove the case where the FIm continues while the
FI` liquidates. We first show that Y mR+Z = Y
m
Z = Y
m if Z ≥ Y m. Indeed, the most effective
security design for preventing the FI` from pretending to be the FIm is that Y mR+Z = Y
m
Z =
Y m, because it follows from the monotonicity assumption that the expected repayment of
the FI` is then largest if Z ≥ Y m. We will thus solve for the equilibrium Y m by assuming Z
≥ Y m, and we then verify that the equilibrium value of Y m satisfies Z ≥ Y m.
If Z ≥ Y m holds, the expected payoff obtained by the FIm (or by outside investors),
ΠSF2(m,Y m) (or ΠSO2(Y m)), is ΠSF2(m,Y m) = σm(R − Y m + Z) + (1 − σm)σZ(Z − Y m)
(or ΠSO2(Y m) = [σm + (1 − σm)σZ ]Y m). Note that under the separating strategy, outside
investors expect that the repayment probability is σm + (1 − σm)σZ. On the other hand, if
the FI` mimics the strategy of the FIm, the expected payoff of the FI` is
ΠSF2(`, Y m) = σ`(R− Y m + Z) + (1− σ`)σZ(Z − Y m). (A3)
The self-selection constraint of the FI` and the participation constraint of the outside in-
vestors are now characterized by
[σ` + (1− σ`)σZ ]Z ≥ σ`(R− Y m + Z) + (1− σ`)σZ(Z − Y m), (A4)
[σm + (1− σm)σZ ]Y m ≥ I. (A5)
Note that the FI` obtains [σ` + (1− σ`)σZ ]Z if it does not mimic the FIm; that is, it liqui-











≥ <2, and Y m = Iσm+(1−σm)σZ if RI < <2. Note that the security satisfies Z
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≥ Y m under Assumption 4. Substituting Y m into ΠSF2(m,Y m), we obtain




ΠSF2(m) = σmR+ [σm + (1− σm)σZ ]Z − I if RI < <2. (A7)
The remaining problem is to show that the separating equilibrium is possible; that is,
the FIm prefers continuing rather than liquidating. Indeed, it follows from Assumption 1
and σm > σ` that ΠSF2(m) ≥ [σm + (1 − σm)σZ ]Z, regardless of whether RI ≥ <2 or RI <
<2. Because the expected payoff obtained by the FIm in liquidation is equal to [σm + (1 −
σm)σZ ]Z, the FIm prefers continuing rather than liquidating. k
Now, let us note that <1 > <2 because of σm > σb. It follows from the proofs of Lemmas
A1 and A2 that the expected payoff of the FI with q under the optimal pooling strategy,
ΠP∗F2(q), is given by (A1) if and only if RI ≥ <1, while the expected payoff of the FIm under
the optimal separating strategy, ΠS∗F2(m), is given by (A6) or (A7) according to RI ≥ <2 or
R
I
< <2. Furthermore, the expected payoff of the FI` under the optimal separating strategy,
ΠS∗F2(`), equals [σ` + (1 − σ`)σZ ]Z.
Suppose that R
I
≥ <1. Then, it follows from (A1) and (A6) with the range RI that ΠP∗F2(m)
≥ ΠS∗F2(m) and ΠP∗F2(`) > ΠS∗F2(`). Thus, in this range RI , the optimal pooling strategy given
in Lemma A1 dominates the optimal separating strategy given in Lemma A2.
If <1 > RI , the pooling strategy given in Lemma A1 is infeasible. Hence, we must compare
the optimal separating strategy given in Lemma A2 and the pooling strategy in which both
the FIm and the FI` prefer to liquidate after the UI withdraws. Suppose that the liquidation




with Y m = Iσm+(1−σm)σZ when
R
I
< <2. Then, the expected payoff of the FIm increases,
because it follows from (A6) and (A7) with σm > σ` and σmR > I that ΠS∗F2(m) > [σm + (1
− σm)σZ ]Z, while the expected payoff of the FI` does not increase, because it follows from
(A3) and the range of R
I
that [σ` + (1 − σ`)σZ ]Z ≥ ΠSF2(`, Y m). Now, the FIm has more
incentive to switch to the continuation strategy defined above than does the FI`. Hence,




≥ <2 or RI < <2, outside investors with D1 beliefs think that the FI is the
FIm. The pooling strategy with liquidation is thus pruned from the game. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3: (i) If R
I
≥ <1, Lemma 2 implies that both the FIm and the FI`
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continue after the withdrawal of the UI. If the UI withdraws, it always receives repayment
I. If the UI continues, the interim expected payoff is σbX because the FI continues while
the UI does not know the type of FI. Thus, the UI continues if and only if σbX ≥ I.
(ii) If <1 > RI , Lemma 2 shows that after the withdrawal of the UI, the FIm continues,
whereas the FI` liquidates. Then, if the UI withdraws, it receives repayment I when the FI
is the FIm, while it receives repayment L under the assumed priority rule when the FI is the
FI` . Thus, the UI continues if and only if σbX ≥ δI + (1 − δ)L. ¥
Proof of Lemma 4: To prove Lemma 4, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma A3: (i) Suppose that 1σ` >
R
I
≥ <1. The optimal strategies of the FI and the UI
are the same as those of Lemma 4(i). The ex ante expected payoff of the FI, Π∗F0, is Π∗F0 =bΠF0 ≡ [p + (1 − p)σb]R + ωZ − I, where ω ≡ p + (1 − p)[σb + (1 − σb)σZ ].
(ii) Suppose that <1 > RI ≥ <2. (a) If <1 > RI ≥ ψ(L), the optimal strategies of the FI
and the UI are the same as those of Lemma 4(ii); and Π∗F0 = [p + (1 − p)σb]R + ωZ −
δ[p+(1−p)σb]−σb
σb I − (1−δ)[p+(1−p)σb]σb L − I. (b) If ψ(L) > RI ≥ <2, the optimal strategies of the
FI and the UI are the same as those of Lemma 4(iii); and Π∗F0 = [p + (1−p)δ(σm−σ`)σZσ`+(1−σ`)σZ ]R +
(1 − p)(1 − δ)L + ωZ + (1 − p)δI − I.
(iii) Suppose that <2 > RI > 1σm . The optimal strategies of the FI and the UI are the same
as those of Lemma 4(iii); and Π∗F0 = [p + (1 − p)δσm]R + (1 − p)(1 − δ)L + ωZ − I.
Proof of Lemma A3: (i) In this case, it follows from Lemma 3(i) that the UI continues
(or withdraws) at s = b if σbX ≥ I (σbX < I), and it follows from Lemma 1 (or 2(i)) that
both the FIm and the FI` continue after the UI decides to continue (or withdraw). Hence,





[p+ (1− p)σb](R−X + Z) + (1− p)(1− σb)σZZ − (I − I), (P1)
subject to the following: (i) (IRU1), [p + (1 − p)σb]X ≥ I; (ii) (ICU1), σbX ≥ I; and (iii)
(NR), R ≥ X ≥ 0. The objective function represents the ex ante expected payoff of the FI.
As the FI continues until time 2 and need not finance I at time 1 in this case, it receives R
+ Z from the cash flows of AI and AO but repays X with probability p + (1 − p)σb, and it
receives Z from the cash flow of AO with probability (1 − p)(1 − σb)σZ . Note that the FI
does not know q at time 0, and must contribute I − I. (IRU1) is the individual rationality
constraint for the UI. (ICU1) ensures that the UI continues at s = b. (NR) is the nonrecourse
constraint of each agent’s claim.
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Z − Iσb + (1− σb)σZ
¸¾
− (I − I), (P2)
subject to the following: (i) (IRU2), pX+(1−p)I ≥ I; (ii) (ICU2), σbX < I; and (iii) (NR).
The objective function represents the ex ante expected payoff of the FI. As the FI continues
until time 2 but must finance I at time 1 when s = b, it receives R + Z from the cash flows
of AI and AO but repays X with probability p, receives R + Z from the cash flows of AI
and AO but repays Iσb+(1−σb)σZ with probability (1 − p)σb, and receives Z from the cash flow
of AO but repays Iσb+(1−σb)σZ with probability (1 − p)(1 − σb)σZ. Note that the repayment
to outside investors in this case is given by Lemma 2(i). (IRU2) is the individual rationality
constraint for the UI. (ICU2) ensures that the UI withdraws at s = b.
Now, comparing the optimal value of problem (P1) with that of problem (P2) yields the
optimal initial security in the case of 1σ` >
R
I
≥ <1. We begin by analyzing problem (P1).
Rearranging (IRU1) and (ICU1), we have X ≥ I




σb that (ICU1) is more likely to bind than (IRU1). Because ΠF0 decreases in X,
ΠF0 is maximized by Xc, which is the minimal value of X that satisfies both (ICU1) and
(NR); that is, Xc = Iσb . Note that X
c satisfies (NR) because R
I
≥ <1 (> 1σb under σm > σ`).
Substituting this Xc into ΠF0 of (P1), we obtain
ΠcF0 = [p+ (1− p)σb]R+ ωZ − p(1− σb)σb I − I. (A8)
We next deal with problem (P2). Rearranging (IRU2) and (ICU2), we have I ≤ X < Iσb ,
which is nonempty. Because ΠF0 decreases in X, ΠF0 is minimized by Xw; that is, Xw = I.
Note that Xw satisfies (NR). Substituting this Xw into ΠF0 of (P2), we have
ΠwF0 = bΠF0 ≡ [p+ (1− p)σb]R+ ωZ − I. (A9)
Comparing (A8) and (A9), we obtain the optimal solution given in Lemma A3(i).
(ii) In this case, it follows from Lemma 3(ii) that the UI continues (or withdraws) at s =
b if σbX ≥ δI + (1 − δ)L (or σbX < δI + (1 − δ)L), and it follows from Lemma 1 (or
43
2(ii)) that both the FIm and the FI` continue after the continuation of the UI (or the FIm
continues but the FI` liquidates after the withdrawal of the UI). If we impose the condition




ΠF0 given by (P1), (P3)
subject to the following: (i) (IRU1); (ii) (ICU3), σbX ≥ δI + (1− δ)L; and (iii) (NR). Note
that (ICU3) ensures that the UI continues at s = b.













Z − σ`Rσ` + (1− σ`)σZ
¸
+ (1− δ)[σ` + (1− σ`)σZ ]Z
¾
− (I − I), (P4)
subject to the following: (i) (IRU4), pX + (1 − p)[δI + (1 − δ)L] ≥ I; (ii) (ICU4), σbX <
δI + (1 − δ)L; and (iii) (NR). The objective function represents the ex ante expected payoff
of the FI. As the FIm (FI`) continues (liquidates) after the UI withdraws, the FI receives R
+ Z from the cash flows of AI and AO but repays X with probability p, receives R + Z from
the cash flows of AI and AO but repays σ`Rσ`+(1−σ`)σZ with probability (1 − p)δσm, receives
Z from the cash flow of AO but repays σ`Rσ`+(1−σ`)σZ with probability (1 − p)δ(1 − σm)σZ ,
and only receives Z with probability (1 − p)(1 − δ)[σ` + (1 − σ`)σZ ] (see Table 1). Note
that the repayment to outside investors is given by Lemma 2(ii). (IRU4) is the individual
rationality constraint for the UI. (ICU4) ensures that the UI withdraws at s = b.
Comparing the optimal value of problem (P3) with problem (P4) leads to the optimal
security in the case of <1 > RI ≥ <2. We begin by solving problem (P3). Using a procedure
similar to solving problem (P1), we have Xc = δI+(1−δ)Lσb and
ΠcF0 = [p+ (1− p)σb]R+ ωZ − p+ (1− p)σbσb [δI + (1− δ)L]− (I − I), (A10)
if only (ICU3) binds, that is, if
δ [p+ (1− p)σb]− σb
p+ (1− p)σb + (1− δ)L > 0. (A11)
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Note that Xc < R for R
I
≥ <2 (> 1σb under Assumption 5(ii)), and that (A11) is satisfied
under Assumption 5(i) because L > σ` RI > σ`σm from Assumption 1. We next proceed to
solve problem (P4). Again, using a procedure similar to solving problem (P2), we obtain Xw
= [1−(1−p)δ]I−(1−p)(1−δ)L
p
if only (IRU4) binds, that is, if (A11) is satisfied. Otherwise, there
is no solution. Note that Xw < R and (A11) are satisfied for R
I
> 1σm and L > σ`σm under




(1− p)δ(σm − σ`)σZ
σ` + (1− σ`)σZ
¸
R+ (1− p)(1− δ)L+ ωZ + (1− p)δI − I. (A12)
Comparing (A10) and (A12) yields the optimal solution when <1 > RI ≥ <2: it is given by
Lemma A3(ii)(a) if <1 > RI ≥ ψ(L), and is given by Lemma A3(ii)(b) if ψ(L) > RI ≥ <2.
(iii) In this case, the decision criterion of the UI continuing or withdrawing is the same as
the case when <1 > RI ≥ <2. Hence, we examine the two situations: σbX ≥ δI + (1 − δ)L
or σbX < δI + (1 − δ)L. In the former, the FI’s problem is the same as in (P3) because













Z − Iσm + (1− σm)σZ
¸
+ (1− δ)[σ` + (1− σ`)σZ ]Z
¾
− (I − I), (P5)
subject to (IRU4), (ICU4), and (NR). Note that the repayment to outside investors is given
by Lemma 2(iii).
Comparing the optimal value of problem (P3) with that of problem (P5) yields the optimal
initial security when <2 > RI > 1σm . We solve problem (P5) in a similar way to problem (P4).
Under Assumptions 1 and 5(i), we have Xw = [1−(1−p)δ]I−(1−p)(1−δ)L
p
and
ΠwF0 = [p+ (1− p)δσm]R+ (1− p)(1− δ)L+ ωZ − I. (A13)
Comparing (A10) and (A13) gives the optimal solution of Lemma A3(iii) under Assumptions
1 and 5(i). k
The results of Lemma 4 are immediate from Lemma A3. ¥
Proof of Lemma 5: The UFE is obtained by the same backward induction procedure as
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that of Section 3. We first discuss the optimal decisions of the FI and the UI at time 1.
Again, at s = g, it is trivial that both the FI and the UI choose to continue. Hence, we
focus on the case of s = b. Let us first examine the FI’s continuation/liquidation decision
after the UI withdraws. Then, only the pooling equilibrium needs to be considered because
the FI does not know which q is realized. Thus, the repayment level of the FI in the capital
market is Iσb+(1−σb)σZ . Because the FI receives nothing if liquidation occurs, the FI continues
(liquidates) after the withdrawal of the UI if σbR − I ≥ 0 (σbR − I < 0). For the FI’s
continuation/liquidation decision after the UI continues, the result is the same as Lemma
1. Now, let us discuss the continuation/withdrawal decision of the UI at time 1. Then, the
argument of the FI’s continuation/liquidation decision stated above leads to the following
two cases: (i) 1σ` >
R
I
≥ 1σb ; and (ii) 1σb > RI > 1σm . In the first case, the FI continues after
the withdrawal of the UI. Hence, the UI continues (or withdraws) if and only if σbX ≥ I (or
σbX < I). In the second case, the FI liquidates after the withdrawal of the UI. Thus, the
UI continues (or withdraws) if and only if σbX ≥ L (or σbX < L).
Now, we proceed to explore the FI’s security offer at time 0. Again, we analyze the
following two cases: (i) 1σ` >
R
I
≥ 1σb ; and (ii) 1σb > RI > 1σm . Furthermore, for each of these
cases, we need to consider both the situations in which: (a) the UI is induced to continue
at s = b; and (b) the UI is induced to withdraw at s = b. Given the optimal decisions of
the FI and the UI at time 1, if 1σ` >
R
I
≥ 1σb , we solve the same problems as (P1) and (P2)
that are in the proof of Lemma 4, and compare their optimal values of ΠF0. Then, it follows
from Lemma A3(i) that X∗ = I and Π∗F0 = bΠF0. In the case where 1σb > RI > 1σm , if the UI
is induced to continue at s = b, we solve the same problem as (P1), except that (ICU1) is
changed by σbX ≥ L because the FI liquidates after the withdrawal of the UI when 1σb > RI
> 1σm . Solving this problem in a similar way to problem (P1), we can show that Π∗F0 = [p
+ (1 − p)σb](R − Lσb ) + ωZ − (I − I) if L > σbp+(1−p)σb ; and Π∗F0 = bΠF0 if L ≤ σbp+(1−p)σb .





p(R − X) + ωZ − (I − I), subject to pX + (1 − p)L ≥ I, σbX
< L and (NR). Applying a procedure similar to that of Lemma A3(i), we can prove that
Π∗F0 = pR + (1 − p)L + ωZ − I if L > σbp+(1−p)σb ; and there is no solution if L ≤ σbp+(1−p)σb .
However, in any case of 1σb >
R
I
> 1σm , we can show that Π∗F0 ≤ bΠF0 under our assumptions.
Summarizing these arguments, the result in this lemma is verified. ¥
Proof of Lemma 6: Note that <2 > 1σb with Assumption 5(ii), and that the FI pays an
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≥ <1, the equilibrium is given by the UFE, which is characterized by Lemma
5(i); and under Assumption 1, if <2 > RI > 1σm , the equilibrium is given by the IFES, which
is featured by Lemma 4(iii) or A3(iii). Now, if <1 > RI ≥ <2, comparing Π∗F0 of Lemma
A3(ii)(a) with Π∗F0 of Lemma 5(i) verifies that the former is smaller than the latter under
(A11) or Assumption 5(i). Note that L > σ`σm holds in Assumption 1, as proved in Lemma
A3(ii). The remaining issue is to check whether Π∗F0 of Lemma A3(ii)(b) is larger than
Π∗F0 of Lemma 5(i). This difference equals (1−p)I<1 [φ(L) − RI ]. Thus, the former is larger (or
smaller) than the latter if φ(L) > (or <) R
I
. Note that ϕ(L) ≥ φ(L) for <1 > RI ≥ <2,
because the foregoing argument with the definition of ϕ(L) in Lemma A3 shows that (Π∗F0
of Lemma 5(i)) ≥ (Π∗F0 of Lemma A3(ii)(a)) ≥ (Π∗F0 of Lemma A3(ii)(b)) as long as RI ≥
ϕ(L). However, we cannot determine whether φ(L) R <2. Hence, these arguments prove
that if <1 > RI ≥ max(φ(L),<2), the equilibrium is given by the UFE of Lemma 5(i); and if
max(φ(L),<2) > RI ≥ <2, the equilibrium is given by the IFES of Lemma 4(iii) or A3(ii)(b).
¥
Proof of Lemma 7: The result of part (i) is evident from Lemma 1. To prove the result of
part (ii), we first specify the expected payoff of the FI with q, ΠPF2(q), in liquidation under
the pooling strategy. In this case, after the UI withdraws, both the FIm and the FI` liquidate
AI and issue the same new security backed by AO to avoid the liquidation of AO. Then,
the repayment level is I−Lσb+(1−σb)σZ , which means that ΠPF2(q) equals [σq + (1 − σq)σZ ][Z −
I−L
σb+(1−σb)σZ ]. We next examine the expected payoff of the FI`, ΠSF2(`), in liquidation under
the separating strategy. In this case, if the FI` liquidates AI and issues a new security backed
by AO to avoid the liquidation of AO, the outside investors demand I−Lσ`+(1−σ`)σZ of the FI`
because they know the FI’s type. Hence, ΠSF2(`) equals [σ` + (1 − σ`)σZ ]Z − I + L. This
implies that if the initial security is backed by AI and AO, ΠSF2(`) is smaller in continuation
than in liquidation under separating, because σ`[R + Z − Iσ`+(1−σ`)σZ ] + (1 − σ`)σZ [Z −
I
σ`+(1−σ`)σZ ] < [σ` + (1 − σ`)σZ ]Z − I + L under Assumption 1. Hence, if the separating
strategy is possible, the FIm continues while the FI` liquidates. Given these findings and
<1L − (<2 − 1−Lσ` ) > 0, we complete the proof by repeating the arguments of Lemma 2. ¥
Proof of Lemma 8: For s = g, the result of this lemma is trivial. For s = b, suppose
that the UI withdraws. Then, the UI receives I irrespective of whether the FI liquidates or
continues. This is because the FI must avoid the liquidation of AO when liquidating AI . On
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the other hand, suppose that the UI continues. Then, the interim expected payoff of the UI
is σbX + (1 − σb)σZX 0. Hence, the UI continues if and only if σbX + (1 − σb)σZX 0 ≥ I. ¥
Proofs of Lemma 9 and Proposition 2: Suppose that the FI offers an initial security
backed by both AI and AO. The discussions in Section 3.2 are modified as follows. First,
given Lemma 7, the partitions of the range of R
I
are (i) 1σ` >
R
I
≥ <1L, (ii) <1L > RI ≥
max (<2 − 1−Lσ` , 1σm ), and (iii) max (<2 − 1−Lσ` , 1σm ) > RI > 1σm . Second, Lemma 7 also implies




[p + (1−p)σb](R − X + Z) + (1 − p)(1 − σb)σZ(Z − X 0) − (I − I), whereas




p(R − X + Z)
+ (1 − p){δσm(R + Z − Y m) + δ(1 − σm)σZ(Z − Y m) + (1 − δ)[σ` + (1 − σ`)σZ ](Z
− Y `)} − (I − I). Note that Y m and Y ` in the latter are given by Lemma 7(ii)(b)(β) for
each range of R
I
. For the constraints of problems (P1)—(P5), (IRU1) is changed by [p + (1 −
p)σb]X + (1 − p)(1 − σb)σZX 0 ≥ I, whereas (IRU4) is changed by pX + (1 − p)I ≥ I. It
also follows from Lemma 8 that (ICU1) and (ICU3) are changed by σbX + (1 − σb)σZX 0 ≥
I, whereas (ICU2) and (ICU4) are changed by σbX + (1 − σb)σZX 0 < I. (NR) is changed
by R + Z ≥ X ≥ 0 and Z ≥ X 0 ≥ 0. For the remaining items in problems (P1)—(P5), there
are no modifications.
Repeating arguments similar to those used to derive Lemma 4, we can derive the following
findings. First, in the modified problems of (P1) and (P3), the optimal value of ΠF0 is
lower than bΠF0 because the modified constraint of (ICU1) or (ICU3) is binding. The result
depends on the fact that the UI obtains more if the modified constraint of (ICU1) or (ICU3) is
binding than if the modified constraint of (IRU1) is binding. Second, in the modified problem
(P2), the introduction of X 0 merely tightens the modified constraint of (ICU2). Thus, it is
optimal to set X 0 = 0; that is, the initial security backed by AI alone is optimal. Third, in
the modified problem (P4), the requirement that the FI` raises the additional amount I −
L when liquidating AI causes the optimal value of ΠF0 to be lower than ΠwF0 of (A12) in
the original problem (P4). This is because the additional raising in liquidation tightens the
self-selection constraint on the FI` so that the FIm must issue the more underpriced security
to separate itself from the FI` (compare Y m in Lemma 2(ii) and Y m in the case of the higher
R
I
in Lemma 7(ii)(b)(β)). Indeed, the difference between the optimal values of the original
and modified problems is given by (1 − p)δ σm+(1−σm)σZσ`+(1−σ`)σZ (I − L).34 Fourth, in the modified
34Note that the occurrence of a decrease in X due to an increase in the payoff of the UI under liquidation
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problem (P5), the optimal value of ΠF0 equals ΠwF0 of (A13) in the original problem (P5)
because the adverse selection issue is ineffective in this case (see Y m in Lemma 2(iii) and
Y m in the case of the lower R
I
in Lemma 7(ii)(b)(β)).35
Now, repeating arguments similar to those of Lemma 4, the configuration of the IFE under
the initial security backed by both AI and AO is given by a form similar to the configuration
of the IFEP, IFEC, and IFES of Lemma 4.
On the other hand, the maximization problems of the FI under uninformed finance are
modified as follows. Using a procedure similar to that of Lemma 5, we can show that under
uninformed finance, the FI continues (or liquidates) after the withdrawal of the UI if σbR
− I ≥ (or <) − (I − L); that is, σbR ≥ L (or σbR < L). Note that the FI must raise the
amount I − L to avoid the liquidation of AO when liquidating AI regarding this security.
Thus, we must analyze the two cases: (i) 1σ` >
R
I
≥ max ( Lσb , 1σm ), and (ii) max ( Lσb , 1σm ) >
R
I
> 1σm . In case (i), the modified problem is the same as the modified problem of (P1) (or
(P2)) under informed finance defined at the beginning of this proof if the FI induces the UI
to continue (or withdraw), except that the FI does not pay ²I . In case (ii), the modified
problem is the same as the modified problem of (P1) under informed finance defined at the
beginning of this proof if the FI induces the UI to continue, except that the FI does not pay
²I . However, it is replaced by max
X,X0
p(R − X) + ωZ + pI + (1 − p)L − I subject to pX
+ (1 − p)I ≥ I, σbX + (1 − σb)σZX 0 < I, R + Z ≥ X ≥ 0, and Z ≥ X 0 ≥ 0 if the FI
induces the UI to withdraw. Note that in this security, the UI can always recover I even if
it withdraws at time 1. Now, repeating arguments similar to those used to derive Lemma 5,
we can show the result of Lemma 9.
Indeed, Lemma 6, with Lemmas 4, 5, and A3, shows that the optimal initial security
backed by AI alone results in the optimal value of ΠF0, which equals bΠF0 under uninformed
finance if 1σ` >
R
I
≥ max(φ(L),<2) or exceeds bΠF0 under informed finance ifmax(φ(L),<2) >
R
I
> 1σm ). The optimal value of ΠF0 in Lemma 6 is also continuous even at the threshold lines
dividing the (L, R
I
) space into each region. However, if the FI offers an initial security backed
by AI and AO, under informed finance, the optimal value of ΠF0 in each of the modified
problems is lower than or equal to that of the corresponding original problem; further, under
uninformed finance, the optimal value of ΠF0 is equal to bΠF0 if RI ≥ Lσb (< 1σb ), and is lower
than or equal to bΠF0 if Lσb > RI . Thus, we establish the result of Proposition 2. ¥
(see the modified constraint of (IRU4)) cancels out the additional payment of Y ` given by Lemma 7(ii)(b)(β).
35Again, a decrease in X cancels out the additional payment of Y `.
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Proof of Proposition 3: The results of R
I
and L are evident from Lemma 6 and φ0(L) >













< 0 and ∂φ
0(L)
∂σZ > 0. Given φ0(L) > 0 and φ(1) = <1, the results of σm, σ` and σZ are derived
from comparative statics on the condition in Lemma 6(i). ¥
Optimality of the short-term debt (Section 6.1): Note that the FI always chooses to
continue if the UI cannot withdraw at time 1. Then, the optimal security design problem
for the FI at time 0 when the initial security is backed by the cash flow of AI is: max
XF
ΠF0
given by (P1), subject to (IRU1) and (NR). Solving this problem, we can show that the ex
ante expected payoff of the FI is equal to bΠF0. Similarly, in the case of the initial security
backed by the cash flow of both AI and AO, we can prove that the ex ante expected payoff
of the FI is equal to bΠF0. ¥
The participation of the UI in the capital market at time 1: If the UI can buy the
security issued by the FI in the capital market at time 1, the results of Sections 3.1.1 and
3.1.2 still hold. However, the results of Section 3.1.3 must be modified if the UI obtains a
positive rent in so doing. Hence, using Lemma 2, Lemma 3 is rewritten as follows.
Lemma 30: Suppose that s = b.




≥ <1 or if RI > <2, the results of Lemma 3 still hold.
Using Lemma 30, we must rearrange (ICU3) and (ICU4) in problems (P3) and (P4) when
<1 > RI ≥ <2. We must also rearrange (IRU4) in problem (P4) when <1 > RI ≥ <2, because
the reservation utility of the UI increases by the same amount as the expected positive
rent. For the other items in problems (P1)—(P5) or for the uninformed case, there are no
modifications. Thus, in problems (P3) and (P4), this extension tightens (ICU3) and (IRU4)
but relaxes (ICU4). In the equilibrium given by Lemmas 4 and 6, only (IRU4) is binding
at the solution to problem (P4). On the other hand, in the equilibrium given by Lemma 6,
the solution to problem (P3) is dominated. These findings show that this extension merely
expands the UFE region of Lemma 6(i), but reduces the IFES region of Lemma 6(ii) where
the FIm repays outside investors’ premiums, because the FI must increase X in the IFES.
Applying similar arguments to obtain the results corresponding to Lemmas 7—9, we can
derive results similar to those of Propositions 1 and 2. ¥
Relaxation of Assumption 4: If Assumption 4 is not satisfied, Z ≥ Y must be binding in
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the proof of Lemma 2. Then, the monotonicity constraint is satisfied with strict inequality:
YR+Z > YZ. In fact, even if Y PR+Z > Y
P
Z in Lemma 2(i), this does not affect the result of
Lemma 4(i) under the risk-neutrality assumption. On the other hand, if Y mR+Z > Y
m
Z in
Lemmas 2(ii) and (iii), this effect makes it more likely that the FI` will mimic the FIm
because the most effective security design for deterring the FI` from mimicking the FIm
is that Y mR+Z = Y
m
Z = Y
m. Hence, the relaxation of Assumption 4 decreases the ex ante
expected payoff of the FI if the UI really withdraws at s = b and if the ex post equilibrium
in the capital market is separating. This implies that the combined region of the IFEP and
IFEC of Lemmas 4(i) and (ii) and the UFE region of Lemma 6(i) expand. However, except







> Z ≥ I−Lσ`+(1−σ`)σZ , the FI can avoid the liquidation of
AO when liquidating AI . Then, Proposition 2 still holds, because with Z ≥ Y binding, the
advantage of the initial security backed by both AI and AO is reduced. If I−Lσ`+(1−σ`)σZ > Z
> 0, the FI` prefers to liquidate AO when liquidating AI . However, as long as the expected
cash flow of AO at s = b is larger than the liquidation value of AO (≡ 0), the advantage
of the initial security backed by both AI and AO is further reduced. Hence, Proposition
2 continues to hold. Furthermore, whichever happens, the optimality of the new security
backed by both AI and AO at time 1 also continues to hold because the difference between
the bankruptcy losses of the FI` and the FIm is still the largest in this class of security. ¥
Relaxation of Assumption 5: To simplify the analysis, we focus on the case in which the
FI can choose whether to undertake information acquisition. Given the proofs of Lemmas
4 and 6, Assumption 5(i) ensures that only (ICU3) (or (IRU4)) binds in problem (P3) (or
(P4) and (P5)), that Xw < R holds in problems (P4) and (P5), and that (Π∗F0 of Lemma
5(i)) > (Π∗F0 of Lemma A3(ii)(a)). Without Assumption 5(i), we obtain the following result.
Lemma A4: Suppose that Assumption 5(i) is not satisfied: δ ≤ 1 − σmσm−σ` p(1−σb)p+(1−p)σb .






, the result of Lemma 6 still holds.






or that L ≤ σb−δ[p+(1−p)σb]
(1−δ)[p+(1−p)σb] .
(a) If 1σ` >
R
I




> 1σm , the equilibrium is given by the UFE that is featured in Lemma 5(ii) or the
IFE in which the FI induces the UI to continue.






, we can still ensure
that only (ICU3) (or (IRU4)) binds in problem (P3) (or (P4) and (P5)), that Xw ≤ R holds
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in problems (P4) and (P5), and that (Π∗F0 of Lemma 5(i)) > (Π∗F0 of Lemma A3(ii)(a)).






, (IRU4) is inconsistent with X ≤ R
in problems (P4) and (P5). Then, in the range <1 > RI under informed finance, the optimal
initial security is given by that which induces the UI to continue and sets (ICU3) to be
binding in problem (P3). However, this implies that the optimal initial security generates
Π∗F0 of Lemma A3(ii)(a). Given that (Π∗F0 of Lemma 5(i)) > (Π∗F0 of Lemma A3(ii)(a)) in
this range and that <2 > 1σb , the IFE is dominated by the UFE of Lemma 5(i) if 1σ` > RI
≥ 1σb . Now, if L ≤ σb−δ[p+(1−p)σb](1−δ)[p+(1−p)σb] , we can show that in the range of <1 > RI , the only IFE
is given by the optimal initial security that induces the UI to continue and sets (IRU1) to
be binding in problem (P3). Furthermore, we can prove that Π∗F0 of this IFE is the same as
that of the UFE of Lemma 5(i) if 1σ` >
R
I
≥ 1σb , except that the FI must pay ²I in the IFE. k
Hence, even though Assumption 5(i) is not satisfied, the main result of Lemma 6 or
Proposition 1 is preserved if R
I
and L are large enough; it also holds for 1σ` > RI ≥ 1σb if L
is not large enough or if L is large enough although R
I
is not large enough. In this region,
Proposition 2 also holds.
Next, if Assumption 5(ii) is not satisfied, then 1σb ≥ <2 (however, note that <1 > 1σb ).
Thus, from Lemmas 4 and 5, we obtain the following result instead of Lemma 6.
Lemma A5. Suppose that Assumption 5(ii) is not satisfied: δ ≤ (1−σZ)σ`σ`+(1−σ`)σZ . (i) If 1σ`
> R
I
≥ max(φ(L), 1σb ), the equilibrium is given by the UFE that is featured by Lemma 5(i).
(ii) If max(φ(L), 1σb ) > RI ≥ max(φ(L),<2), the equilibrium is given by the IFES that is
featured by Lemma 6(ii) where the FIm repays outside investors’ premiums or the UFE that
is featured by Lemma 5(ii). (iii) If max(φ(L),<2) > RI > 1σm , the result of Lemma 6 still
holds.
The only difference is that if R
I
lies in the middle range of R
I
∈ (<2, 1σb ), there may be a
UFE region where both the UI and the FI continue at s = b or a UFE region where the UI
withdraws and the FI liquidates AI at s = b. Thus, in this range, the overinvestment problem
may occur because the UI does not withdraw at s = b, or the underinvestment problem may





σ` ) outside of this middle range. ¥
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Figure 1.  Timeline in the Basic Model.  C: continuation; W: withdrawal; and L: liquidation.
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